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INTRODUCTION
Bankruptcy. The word conjures up several images in the minds of
laymen, none of them very flattering. Of course, there is the image of
the deadbeat individual who foolishly went way beyond his means,
and is now getting rewarded for irresponsibility. There is also the im-
age of a "down-and-out" company that was deservedly pumshed for
its fiscal incompetence, only now to be resurrected at the expense of
innocent other parties. There is the image of a greedy group of bank-
ruptcy lawyers standing over a copy of the Bankruptcy Code (Code),'
heads bowed, paying homage to that which has put food in their
mouths and BMWs in their driveways. Although this cymcism is un-
warranted, the perception of abuse is still something that Congress
and the courts cannot ignore. It calls into question the legitimacy and
goals of our legal system itself. No wonder our legislators and judges
have been troubled by a new development on the horizon: the rush of
environmental polluters filing for bankruptcy 2
It seems right that if an individual or corporation has created an
environmental hazard, its fulfillment of any legal obligations to allevi-
1. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1993).
2. See Philippe J. Kahn, Note, Bankruptcy Versus Environmental Protection: Dis-
charging Future CERCLA Liability in Chapter 11, 14 CARDOZO L. REv. 1999, 2006
(1993) (recognizing that environmental liability will induce some parties to file for
bankruptcy) (citing Norman I. Silber, Note, Cleaning Up in Bankruptcy: Curbing
Abuse of the Federal Bankruptcy Code by Industrial Polluters, 85 COLUM. L. REv 870,
871 & n.14 (1985)). Although a bit dated, the United States Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA) reported that 74 hazardous waste facilities had already filed for
bankruptcy as of August 1985, and that during the next 50 years voluntary bankruptcy
petitions would be filed by 23-30% of the owners or operators of waste disposal facili-
ties. Joseph L. Cosetti and Jeffrey M. Friedman, Midlantic National Bank, Kovacs and
Penn Terra: The Bankruptcy Code and State Environmental Law-Perceived Conflicts
and Options for the Trustee and State Environmental Agencies, 7 J.L. & COM. 65, 68
(1987) (citing U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFricE, HAZARDOUS WASTE, ENVIRON-
MENTAL SAFEGUARDS JEOPARDIZED WHEN FAcILrrIEs CEASE OPERATING 18 (1986);
see also Paula Thornton Perkins, Comment, Abandonment in the Face of Possible
Toxic Contamination: What's a Lender to Do?, 44 S.W L.J. 1563, 1563-64 n.5 (1991)
(citing Cosetti & Friedman). The number of existing hazardous waste facilities m the
United States is unclear. The EPA has put forth the "low-end" estimate of 33,000.
Insurer Liability for Cleanup Costs of Hazardous Waste Sites, Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Policy Research and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking, Fi-
nance and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 48 (1990) (testimony of James M.
Strock, EPA)). This contrasts greatly with the figures of the General Accounting Of-
fice, which says that the true number is closer to 368,000. Douglas C. Ballantine,
Note, Recovering Costs for Cleaning Up Hazardous Waste Sites: An Examination of
State Superlien Statutes, 63 IND. L.J. 571 n.2 (1988) (citing Marcotte, Toxic Blackacre:
Unprecedented Liability for Landowners, 73 A.B.A. J. 66, 67 (1987)).
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ate the danger to the community should be a priority. However, m
the name of the "fresh start" and the equitable treatment of creditors,
the Bankruptcy Code has provided several debtor protections that ap-
pear to shield a polluter from its environmental liabilities.3 One of
these controversial provisions is Section 554, which allows the trustee
of a bankruptcy estate to "abandon" economically burdensome prop-
erty.4 The provision creates an apparent conflict. By abandoning
property containing hazardous waste and thereby mminimzmg the
dram of funds from the estate, the interest of the debtor and many of
its creditors is furthered. The government, as overseer of the public
interest, has reacted by trying to hold the offending party accountable
and force adherence to the law.5
As with other issues, a test case was needed, one that would allow
the United States Supreme Court to finally determine who would pre-
vail. In 1986, such a case appeared on the horizon. Midlantic National
Bank v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection6 should
have answered all the questions, and foreclosed existing debate on the
abandonment dilemma. Unfortunately, the landmark decision still
left the legal landscape muddled and all interested onlookers in a state
of confusion.
Part I of this Note provides a brief outline of how federal and state
governments enforce environmental obligations. Much of this discus-
sion will focus on the federal Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA or
Superfund).7 Tis approach is appropriate not only because of CER-
3. Ballantine, supra note 2, at 572 (citing Kokoszka v. Bedford, 417 U.S. 642, 645-
46 (1977)). As Ballantine points out though, "the 'fresh start' policy is not applicable
to corporate debtors because the 1978 [Bankruptcy Reform] Act does not contain a
provision for the discharge of debts of non-individuals." Ballantine, supra note 2, at
572 n.9.
4. 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1993).
5. The view that environmental law and bankruptcy policy are in irreconcilable
conflict is not espoused by all. See generally Douglas G. Baird, Environmental Com-
pliance, Permitting and Cleanup Obligations: To What Extent Should They Take Pre-
cedence Over Other Obligations During and After Bankruptcy?, 18 EN TL. L. REP.
10,352 (A.B.A.) (1988); Thomas H. Jackson, Of Liquidation, Continuation, and Delay:
An Analysis of Bankruptcy Policy and Nonbankruptcy Rules, 60 AM. BANKR. L.J. 399
(1986); Cosetti & Friedman, supra note 2, at 67 ("We believe that the [Midlantic]
Court incorrectly perceived a conflict between the Bankruptcy Code and state envi-
ronmental law. We do not perceive such a conflict.") (emphasis added).
6. 474 U.S. 494 (1986).
7. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. II. 1990)). In response to an unanticipated deluge of
environmentally contaminated sites, Congress later amended CERCLA with the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA). Lon Jonas, Note, Divid-
ing the Toxic Pie: Why Superfund Contingent Contribution Claims Should Not Be
Barred by the Bankruptcy Code, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv 850, 851 (1991) (citing Pub. L. No.
99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (amending scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675)).
SARA "extended the life of Superfund for five years and endowed the program with
an $8.5 billion budget." Id.
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CLA's powerful role as the de facto "Federal Environmental Attorney
General," but also because many states have based their own environ-
mental laws on this regulatory scheme.
Part II addresses the history of abandonment in the bankruptcy
context before Midlantic. The story is one of continual evolution, a
growing legislative and judicial acceptance of the practice conditioned
only upon a legitimate "cost-benefit" analysis by the Chapter 7
trustee.8
However, the strength of legal consensus is never a match for the
discretionary power of the United States Supreme Court. As will be
discussed in Part III, the Court in Midlantic turned its back on justifi-
able statutory interpretation and the well-reasoned decisions of the
lower courts when it created an environmental "exception" to a Chap-
ter 7 trustee's traditional abandonment power. In the process, the
Court has left itself vulnerable to criticism by those legal "rebels" who
take the language of the Code seriously and those who have not lost
sight of what bankruptcy is really about.
When a Chapter 7 trustee petitions the bankruptcy court to aban-
don a hazardous waste site, judges are expected to reconcile the facts
according to principles of stare decisis. However, the open-endedness
of Justice Powell's language makes the job a difficult one. In the pro-
cess of applying Midlantic, courts have been taking the easy way out
by blatantly distorting the Midlantic mandate to achieve the "results"
they desire. Part IV outlines the direction of this post-Midlantic case
law.
Part V suggests a decision-making model that judges can apply
when faced with a fact pattern analogous to Midlantic and its progeny.
This test to resolve the abandonment puzzle, unlike the process ad-
hered to by the post-Midlantic courts, is justifiable because it properly
adheres to Midlantic without losing sight of what bankruptcy is really
trying to accomplish.
8. This Note's emphasis will be on abandonment by a Chapter 7, rather than a
Chapter 11 trustee. As Jackson observes: "we will have to concern ourselves with
whether we should treat liquidation cases [Chapter 7] fundamentally different from
continuation [Chapter 11] cases." Jackson, supra note 5, at 406. This author agrees
with Jackson that there should be differing treatment. Id. ("In continuation cases
[unlike instantaneous liquidations], . we have to deal with the debtor's post-bank-
ruptcy period and relate that to the issues already set out."). Since this Note is mak-
ing an argument in the context of Midlantic, a Chapter 7 case, and given the
distinctions between the two types of proceedings, concentrating on the liquidation
scenario is both easier and probably more useful. See Perkins, supra note 2, at 1568
n.53 ("Trustees in charge of hazardous waste properties usually can abandon only in
liquidations because 28 U.S.C. § 959 (1988) precludes it in reorganizations if so doing
would amount to illegal waste disposal.").
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I. GovERNMENT ENFORCEMENT OF ENvIRONMENTAL
OBLIGATIONS
Two kinds of laws comprise the heart of the federal government's
prompt and effective response to the dangers of hazardous waste.
There are "preventive" statutes such as the Clean Air Act9 , the Clean
Water Act,10 and the Resource Conservation and Control Act1' which
regulate the activities of potential polluters. Then there is CERCLA,
the more "activist" form of environmental regulation. This "damage-
control" statute presupposes that there has already been some viola-
tion of an applicable environmental law "through threatened or actual
releases, spills or discharges of hazardous substances at existing or
abandoned sites."'1 2 If these circumstances constitute "an imminent
and substantial danger to the public health or welfare,"' 3 the Environ-
mental Protection Agency can obtain injunctions and issue adminis-
trative orders that require the polluter to spend its own money to
abate the hazards.' 4 Under these "dire" conditions, the agency also
has the option of conducting its own clean up.'5
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1993). For an excellent outline of the Act, see Arlene
E. Mirsky ET AL., The Interface Between Bankruptcy and Environmental Laws, 46
Bus. LAW. 623, 683-85 (1991).
10. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988); see Mirsky -r AL., supra note 9, at 681-83 (sy-
nopsis of the provisions).
11. Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991i (1993)).
RCRA encompasses the 1976 amendments to the Solid Waste Disposal Act. See
Jonathan K. Van Patten and Richard D. Puetz, Bankruptcy and Environmental Obli-
gations: The Clash Between Private Relief and Public Policy, 35 S.D. L. Rv. 220,223
n.21 (1990); see also Mirsky ET AL., supra note 9, at 677-81 (description of RCRA's
components).
12. Jill Thompson Losch, Comment, Bankruptcy v. Environmental Obligations:
Clash of the Titans, 52 LA. L. REv 137, 139 (1991).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1988).
14. Danel Klerman, Note, Earth First? CERCLA Reimbursement Claims and
Bankruptcy, 58 U. C. L. REv. 795, 797 (1991) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1988)).
An important point made by Klerman is that "courts have facilitated the use of these
remedies by liberally interpreting the 'imminent and substantial endangerment re-
quirement'" Id at 798 (citing several cases, including United States v. Ottati & Goss,
Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1361, 1394 (D.N.H. 1985)). This standard has been satisfied "when-
ever hazardous substances have been released, even if the feared harm may not mate-
nalize for several years." Id.
15. Losch, supra note 12, at 139-40 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(23), (24) (1988)).
Losch tries to emphasize that the clean up actions authorized by CERCLA are not
boundless, because they are limited to "removal" and "remedial" measures. Id. The
provision defines "remedial" measures as
the cleanup or removal of released hazardous substances from the environ-
ment as may be necessary m the event of the threat of release of
hazardous substances into the environment [and as may be] necessary to
monitor, assess, and evaluate the release or threat of release . or the tak-
ing of such other actions as may be necessary to prevent, minimize, or miti-
gate damage.
Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23)). "Remedial" is defined as "those actions consistent
with permanent remedy taken instead of, or m addition to, removal actions." Id.
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24)(1)). This terminology is clearly not restrictive at all, m
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If the second option is taken, a cost recovery action may be brought
against any "potentially responsible party" (PRP) by the federal gov-
ernment or a private party for the costs expended in its clean up.
16
The particular costs that can be recovered from any of the PRPs "in-
clude necessary response costs incurred by the government or by non-
governmental parties consistent with the National Contingency Plan
(NCP), damages to natural resources and the costs of assessing those
damages, and health assessment costs authorized under CERCLA."' 7
As soon as CERCLA was passed in 1980, its strong enforcement
measures were criticized for being overly harsh. For example, the im-
position of strict liability without a showing of negligence was consid-
ered extreme. 8 The cries grew louder in 1986 when Congress passed
a number of amendments strengthening CERCLA,' 9 including one
that gave the EPA "a lien on all property belonging to the PRP that is
subject to or affected by the removal or remedial action."20
fact, conferring upon the agency enormous discretion to attack past, present and fu-
ture harm.
16. Losch, supra note 12, at 139-40 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988)). A PRP can
include:
(1) [the] owner and operator of a vessel or facility, (2) any person who at
the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facil-
ity at which such hazardous substances were disposed of, (3) any person who
by contract, agreement or otherwise arranged with a transporter for trans-
port for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed
by such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration
vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and containing such
hazardous substances, and (4) any person who accepts or accepted any haz-
ardous substances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incinera-
tion vessels or sites selected by such person, from whMch there is a release, or
a threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a haz-
ardous substance
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1989). It is important to remember that for liability to be as-
sessed, the actual cleanup must be completed. Van Patten & Puetz, supra note 11, at
226 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (1989)).
17. Losch, supra note 12, at 140 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a) (1991)).
18. Id. at 141. CERCLA does not expressly provide for strict liability, but the
courts have had no problem imposing such a threshold. Kahn, supra note 2, at 2001-
02 n.15 (citing United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 167 (4th Cir. 1988) ("We
agree with the overwhelming body of precedent that has interpreted [CERCLA] sec-
tion 107(a) as establishing a strict liability scheme."), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106
(1989); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985) ("Con-
gress intended that responsible parties be held strictly liable, even though an explicit
provision for strict liability was not included m the [congressional] compromise.")).
19. Klerman, supra note 14, at 798 (citing Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986).
20. Losch, supra note 12, at 140 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(1) (1988)). Tins federal
lien, created to ensure that the EPA would be able to collect cleanup costs from bank-
rupt polluters, attaches "when the costs are incurred or when the owner is given no-
tice of potential liability." Van Patten & Puetz, supra note 11, at 227 (citing 42 U.S.C.
99 9607(1), (2) (1989)). Prior to this time however, "the lien is subject to the rights of
any prior purchaser, holder of a security interest, or judgment lien creditor, as per-
fected under state law." Cosetti & Friedman, supra note 1, at 100. It should be obvi-
ous then, as Cosetti and Friedman write, "[tlfis low priority provided is not likely to
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Despite the seeming omnipotence of CERCLA and its accompany-
ing federal legislation, states still felt that it did not adequately meet
their environmental and financial needs.21 They responded by enact-
mg environmental legislation modeled after the federal acts, which
gave the state environmental agency "activist" regulatory power simi-
lar to the EPA. 2 In a move analogous to the creation of the CER-
CLA lien, at least seven states, motivated by the same desire to have
some form of "bankruptcy insurance," have also passed legislation
that grants the state a priority lien against the debtor.2 Through use
be valuable." Id. The EPA is faced with another problem in situations where the
EPA incurs clean up costs after the bankruptcy petition has been filed. Section 544(a)
of the Code makes liens arising post-petition, and thus these particular CERCLA
liens, avoidable. Kahn, supra note 2, at 2008-09 n.46. The First Circuit has side-
stepped the issue of the efficacy of the CERCLA lien within the bankruptcy frame-
work by declaring the lien unconstitutional. IL at 2009 n.46 (citing Reardon v.
United States, 947 F.2d 1509 (1st Cir. 1991)).
21. Ballantine, supra note 2, at 571 (citing Elizabeth Warren, State Hazardous
Waste Superfunds and CERCLA: Conflict or Complement?, 13 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,348
(Nov. 1983)).
22. Van Patten & Puetz, supra note 11, at 223 (citing California Hazardous Waste
Control Act, CAL. IEALTHI & SArumr CODE §§ 25100 et seq. (West Supp. 1990); Min-
nesota Environmental Response and Liability Act, MIN. STAT. ANN. §§ 115B.01 et
seq. (West Supp. 1990); South Dakota Hazardous Waste Management, S.D.C.L.
§§ 34A-11-1 et seq. (Supp. 1989); Nebraska Environmental Protection Act, NEB. REv.
STAT. §§ 81-1501 et seq. (1987)). See also Perkins, supra note 2, at 1569-70 n.80 (some
examples of state statutes passed to supplement CERCLA include: COLO. REv
STAT. §§ 25-16-101 to -201 (West 1990 & Supp. 1990); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4417 to -
4417B (Michie 1985 and Supp. 1990); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 455B.381 to .399, 455B.423
to 432 (West 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-3431 (1985)); Note, Midlantic National
Bank v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection: Supreme Court Bal-
ances Objectives of the Bankruptcy Code and State Environmental Laws, 18 Loy. U.
C. LJ. 1209, 1216 n.64 (1987) (citing Water Pollution Control Act, CoN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 22a-416 to -417 (West 1985 & Supp. 1986); Hazardous Waste Manage-
ment Act, Mica. Comp. LAWS ANN. 33 299.501-.551 (West 1984); Hazardous Waste
Management Act, N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 147-A:1-20 (Supp. 1986); Spill Compen-
sation and Control Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11 (West 1982 & Supp. 1986);
Collection, Treatment & Disposal of Refuse and Other Solid Waste, N.Y. ENvTL.
CONSERV. LAW. 99 27-0101 to -1321 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1987)).
23. See Mirsky ET A.., supra note 9, at 688-89 n.22 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 22a-452a (Supp. 1989); ILL. ANN. STAT. § 1021.3 (Supp. 1989); N.H. Rnv. STAT.
ANN. § 147-B:10-b (Supp. 1986); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.1If(f) (Supp. 1989); ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38 § 1371 (Supp. 1988); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN., Ch. 21E, § 13
(1988); TEx. Ruv CIrv. STAT. ANN. art. 4477-7 § 13(g)(7)). 'Two states, Arkansas and
Tennessee, "[r]ecently repealed the super priority provisions of their lien laws,
leaving instead only a non-pnority environmental lien." William J. Hamel, The Great
Superlien Scare Finally Over?, ENV'T REP. (BNA), August 31, 1990, at 853. As Hamel
mentions, "[nlon-pnority liens are not as feared [by lenders and potential purchasers]
as superliens. [because] they take precedence over all claims except those secured
by a prior perfected security interest." Id. The non-priority liens are more prevalent
than their superlien counterparts. Id. ("Seventeen states, now have some sort of
non-priority environmental lien law."). It is clear that the incentive to create both
types of liens was provided by the Supreme Court in Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274,
286 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("A State may protect its interest mn the en-
forcement of its environmental laws by giving cleanup judgments the status of statu-
tory liens or secured claims.").
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of these "superliens," the lienholder (the state) can collect its reim-
bursement costs for cleaning up a hazardous waste site before the
other creditors are paid.24
II. ABANDONMENT, BANKRUPTCY, AND Th EVOLUTION
oF 11 U.S.C. 554
Undoubtedly, one of the "bankruptcy disasters" that the federal
and state government wanted to insure themselves against was aban-
donment. Put succinctly, abandonment is "a divestiture of all interests
in property that were property of the estate."' 5 It is clear that "the
principle of abandonment was developed by the courts to protect the
bankruptcy estate from the various costs and burdens of having to ad-
minister property which could not conceivably benefit unsecured
creditors of the estate."26 Until 1978, the Chapter 7 trustee lacked
express statutory authority to abandon burdensome estate property.27
Despite this, history has been on the trustees' side.
A. The History of Abandonment Before Midlantic
At the turn of the century, it was generally accepted that abandon-
ment of burdensome property was simply a logical extension of the
trustee's common law power to reject executory contracts, and should
be authorized.28 Within the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,29 relevant provi-
sions did not definitively recognize this abandonment threshold.
30
However, by allowing the abandonment of property weighed down by
taxes, patent applications, trademarks and executory leases, a trend
toward liberal treatment was taking shape.3 Courts began to echo
these pro-abandonment sentiments, utilizing the case law and the stat-
ute to craft an implicit legal realization of the trustees' abandonment
desires.32 Tis judicial creation "served the overriding purpose of
24. Ballantine, supra note 2, at 573. See generally id. at 573-85 (for a discussion of
the Takings Clause and Contracts Clause questions raised by these priority liens); see
also Ellen E. Sward, Resolving Conflicts Between Bankruptcy Law and the State Police
Power, 1987 Wis. L. REv 403, 439-41 (explaining the practical problems with attach-
ing the superlien that makes it an unsatisfactory solution for states trying to recover
cleanup costs).
25. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUP-TCY, 554.02[2] at 554-57 (L. King et al. eds., 15th ed.
1993) [hereinafter COLLIER].
26. In re Paolella, 79 B.R. 607, 609 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987).
27. 4 COLLIER 554.01 at 554-1 to -2; Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 508.
28. 4 Collier [ 554.01 at 554-2.
29. Pub. L. No. 55-541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898).
30. 4 COLLIER 554.01 at 554-1 n.1. (describing §§ 64a(4), 70a(2), and 70b of the
Act).
31. Id.
32. See Perkins, supra note 2, at 1564 (citing First Nat'l Bank v. Lasater, 196 U.S.
115, 118 (1905); Dushane v. Beall, 161 U.S. 513, 515 (1896); American File Co. v.
Garrett, 110 U.S. 288, 295 (1884); Gochenour v. Cleveland Terminals Bldg. Co., 118
F.2d 89, 94 (6th Cir. 1941); Federal Land Bank v. Nalder, 116 F.2d 1004, 1007 (10th
Cir.), cert.denied, 313 U.S. 578 (1941); Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Logan, 92 F.2d 28,
1993]
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bankruptcy liquidation: the expeditious reduction of the debtor's
property to money, for equitable distribution to creditors."33
Finally, there was the codification of the common law rule in the
Bankruptcy Code of 1978, amended in 1984: "[a]fter notice and a
hearing, the trustee may abandon any property of the estate that is
burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential value and bene-
fit to the estate. '3 4 The clear language of section 554(a), coupled with
the lack of legislative history addressing the scope of the trustee's
abandonment power,35 seemed to indicate only one thing: the
trustee's cost-benefit analysis should be the sole consideration m
abandonment decisions. If the test yielded the conclusion that the
property was burdensome or inconsequential to the estate to the det-
riment of the unsecured creditors, the property would and should be
abandoned by the Chapter 7 trustee.36 The commentators and cases
appeared to be satisfied with such a result.37
31 (5th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 763, and cert. denied, 303 U.S. 636 (1938);
Central States Life Ins. Co. v. Koplar Co., 80 F.2d 754, 757-58 (8th Cir. 1935), cert.
denied, 298 U.S. 687 (1936); Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Scales, 62 F.2d 582, 585 (5th
Cir. 1933); Quinn v. Gardner, 32 F.2d 772, 773 (8th Cir. 1929)).
33. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 508 (citing Kothe v. R.C. Taylor Trust, 280 U.S. 224,227
(1930)); see also Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 328 (1966); 4 CoLLIER 554.01 at
554-2 to -3).
34. 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1993); see 2 CowANs BANKRusrcy LAW & PRACricE
§ 9.9 at 80-81 (Danel R. Cowans et al. eds., 1989) ("The trustee has a duty to investi-
gate values and liens where the contention is that there is no equity in the estate and
to make a showing upon which a court may base its order.") (emphasis added) [here-
mafter CowANs]. According to one commentator, "'[b]urdensome' property is prop-
erty that is essentially worthless because it is heavily subject to taxes, liens, or other
encumbrances, while 'inconsequential' means the debtor lacks equity in the prop-
erty." Ballantine, supra note 2, at 578. The distinction between inconsequential
"value" and inconsequential "benefit" in the provision should also not be ignored. 2
COWANS § 9.9 at 79; see also In re K.C. Mach. Tool Co., 816 F.2d 238, 245 (6th Cir.
1987)).
35. The legislative history states: "[u]nder this section the court may authorize the
trustee to abandon any property of the estate that is burdensome to the estate or that
is of inconsequential value to the estate. Abandonment may be to any party with a
possessory interest in the property abandoned." S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
92 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5878.
36. See Perkins, supra note 2, at 1563 n.1 ("Neither the Bankruptcy Code nor
Bankruptcy Rule 6007 places a time limitation on the trustee [for abandoning].
Under the pre-code rule, however, the trustee had to abandon within a reasonable
time.").
37. Cosetti & Friedman mention that
[p]nor to Midlantic and Quanta Resources, the two well-recognized bank-
ruptcy treatises, "Norton Bankruptcy Law & Practice" and "Collier on
Bankruptcy," do not mention any public health and safety exception to
abandonment under section 554(a) that is based on state law. Professor
Norton notes that "[t]he best interests of the estate and not the interests of
the debtor and creditors will determine whether property should be
abandoned."
Cosetti & Friedman, supra note 2, at 75 (citation omitted).
As for the environmental cases supporting the strict construction view of the
Code's abandonment provision, none stands out more than the often-cited Kovacs,
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B. The Current Statutory Mechanism
The same cannot be said for the state and federal governments,
which saw abandonment as a device that would destroy any chance for
enforcement of environmental orders and the possible recovery of
hazardous waste cleanup costs. When a Chapter 7 petition is filed
either voluntarily by the debtor,38 or involuntarily by the debtor's
creditors,39 the proceeding commences and a bankruptcy estate "sepa-
rate and distinct from the debtor is created."'' 4 The "legal or equitable
interests of the debtor in property" are then absorbed by the estate."
A trustee is appointed42 to sell off these "assets" for the ultimate ben-
efit of the debtor's unsecured creditors.43 That is the trustee's job and
is usually the trustee's only concern. For a Chapter 7 trustee oversee-
ing an estate saddled with orders to comply with environmental laws
and bills for the cleanup of hazardous wastes that cannot be paid, it is
inevitable that the legal sanction to "abandon" burdensome property
will be crucial in the successful administration or disposition of the
estate's liabilities.
Following abandonment of the contaminated property by a Chapter
7 trustee, the EPA and state agencies cannot be sure that their costs
will be reimbursed as first-priority administrative expenses.44 There is
a strong likelihood that the governments will be holding an unsecured
claim against the estate worth the proverbial "twenty cents on the dol-
lar" when the assets are finally distributed. Thus, the state and federal
governments are left with the dual problem of property that is still
469 U.S. at 284-85 n.12. See also In re Borne Chem. Co., 54 B.R. 126, 135 (Bankr.
D.NJ. 1984); In re A & T Trailer Park, 53 B.R. 144, 147 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1985); In re
Catamount Dyers, Inc., 50 B.R. 790, 795 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1985). But see N.J. Dep't of
Envtl. Protection v. National Smelting of NJ., Inc. (In re Nat'l Smelting of N.J.), 49
B.R. 1012, 1015 (D. Colo. 1985) (refusing to allow abandonment).
38. 11 U.S.C. § 301 (1993).
39. 11 U.S.C. § 303 (1993).
40. D. Ethan Jeffery, Personal Liability of a Bankruptcy Trustee Since Midlantic
National Bank v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection: The Environ-
mental Law and Bankruptcy Code Conflict Threatens to Engulf Bankruptcy Trustees, 2
VILL. ENv-rL. LJ. 403, 405 n.11 (1991) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1988)).
41. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1993).
42. In a Chapter 7 case, after the order for relief (ie., when the petition is filed),
an interim trustee must be chosen by the United States trustee. 11 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1)
(1993). The interim Chapter 7 trustee will then become the permanent trustee unless
another person is elected at the § 341 creditors meeting. 11 U.S.C. §§ 341, 702(d)
(1993).
43. 11 U.S.C. § 704(1) (1993) (among other duties, the Chapter 7 trustee is obli-
gated to "collect and reduce to money the property of the estate and close such
estate as expeditiously as is compatible with the best interests of parties in interest
44. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A) (1993) ("After notice and a hearing, there shall be
allowed administrative expenses including, the actual, necessary costs and
expenses of preserving the estate "); 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1) (1993) (administrative
expenses granted first priority in distribution of the estate); see mfra note 176 and
accompanying text.
1993] 229
230 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. V
threatemng public health and a bill that is only partly paid. As the
process continues, the offending property is irrevocably pulled out of
the bankruptcy estate45 and subsequently passed to any person or en-
tity with a possessory interest m it.4 6 This is usually the bankrupt
debtor who will be revested with the property's title.47 Title is re-
garded as belonging to the bankrupt just as if he had never been m
bankruptcy, and stands as it did before filing.48
If the Chapter 7 proceeding is for an individual debtor, such liability
for the environmental cleanup can be discharged.49 If the debtor is a
45. In re Polumbo, 271 F Supp. 640, 643 (W.D. Va. 1967).
46. In re Purco, Inc. 76 B.R. 523,532 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1987); see also 2 COWANS
§ 9.9 at 80.
47. In re Motley, 10 B.R. 141, 145 (M.D. Ga. 1981). As one commentator men-
tions m passing, it appears that other bankruptcy courts are unwilling to say that ac-
tual title is transferred or even affected by the process of abandonment. For these
courts, abandonment is not regarded as the "divesting and revesting of title to prop-
erty." See Leonard J. Long, Burdensome Property, Onerous Laws, and Abandon-
ment: Revisiting Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department of Environmental
Protection, 21 HoFsTRA L. Rnv 63, 91-92 n.83 (1992). Instead, "it is now viewed as a
divesting and revesting of control over the property." Id., see also In re R-B-Co., Inc.
of Bossier, 59 B.R. 43, 45 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1986) ("The Court does not believe that
abandonment can be used, as a means of effecting a transfer of title. Under
section 554, upon abandonment, the trustee or debtor-m-possession is simply divested
of control of the property because it is no longer property of the estate.") (quoted in
Long). The trustee, according to these dissenting courts, holds a "constructive" inter-
est, rather a "real" interest in the property of the estate. Long, supra at 91-92 n.83;
see also Jim Walter Holmes, Inc. v. Saylors (In re Saylors), 869 F.2d 1434, 1437 n.2
(11th Cir. 1989) ("Upon abandonment, the interest held constructively by the Chapter
7 trustee reverted to the [debtor].") (quoted in Long). Despite their differences, the
act of trustee abandonment is still considered by both sides to be a legitimate practice.
Long, supra at 91-92 n.83.
48. In re Tarpley, 4 B.R. 145, 146 (M.D. Tenn. 1980).
49. 11 U.S.C. § 727 (1993). The effect of a discharge is that "creditors are prohib-
ited from attempting to collect debts that were included in the discharge." Linda
Johannsen, United States v. Whizco, Inc.. A Further Refinement of the Conflict Be-
tween Bankruptcy Discharge and Environmental Cleanup Obligations, 20 ENvrT.. L.
207, 211 (1990). Discharge techmcally occurs "[a]fter the estate is liquidated and all
available funds are disbursed." Id. There are nine statutory exceptions to discharge
mandated m the Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 523 (1993); 11 U.S.C. § 524(0 (1993) (A vol-
untary reaffirmation by the debtor provides another way m which creditors can col-
lect). Of these, "two have relevance for environmental claims." Mirsky E-T AL.,
supra note 9, at 657. "[W]illful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or
to the property of another entity" is the first relevant exception. 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(6) (1993); see, e.g., In re Berry, 84 B.R. 717, 721 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1987)
("Debtor's abandonment of highly dangerous chemicals in open and leaking vats and
his failure to maintain proper containment of chemicals constituted willful and mali-
cious conduct for nondischargeability purposes."); see also In re Tmkham, 59 B.R.
209, 217 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1986) (debtor must be aware of the certainty of harm to
trigger exception). The second pertinent exception is Section 523(a)(7) which excepts
a debt from discharge "to the extent such debt is for a fine, penalty, or forfeiture
payable to and for the benefit of a governmental unit, and is not compensation for
actual pecumary loss. " 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7) (1993); see, e.g., Kelly v. Robinson,
479 U.S. 36, 52 (1986) (restitution order, necessary for the obtainment of probation in
a welfare fraud case, is nondischargeable under the fines or penalties provision); see
also In re Wright, 87 B.R. 1011, 1013-16 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1988) (section 523(a)(7) ap-
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corporation that is liquidating, discharge is not permitted,50 but the
only thing left m the end is a worthless corporate carcass. 51 It has
been asserted that secured creditors should then be held accounta-
ble.5' The lack of precedential support for this argument53 does not
bode well for the EPA and its state allies. It is more likely that a
government agency will have to look to itself and ultimately the tax-
payers for the funds.
plied when criminal restitution to pay the FDIC was ordered because this constituted
pumshment, not compensation).
50. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1) (1993) ("The court shall grant the debtor a dis-
charge, unless the debtor is not an individual.").
51. Long, supra note 46, at 106-07. Long adds that:
[u]sually after a Chapter 7 liquidation is completed, the corporate debtor
simply ceases to exist (i.e., all the stock of the corporate debtor is canceled),
or the corporate debtor continues to legally exist but with no assets. And
ceasing to exist or having no assets, as a legal or practical matter the corpo-
rate debtor cannot be held to account for the cost of an environmental clean-
up. A non-entity cannot be held liable for the cost of an environmental
cleanup; and getting shareholders in a corporation with no assets (but facing
the prospects of an environmental cleanup) to contribute new capital to the
debtor is not a very realistic option.
52. See Van Patten & Puetz, supra note 11, at 248 n.206 ("Although what happens
after there has been an abandonment by the trustee is not always clear, it is likely that
the property m this case would go to the secured creditors."). Cosetti & Friedman
posit the argument that Section 506(c) can provide the basis for secured creditor lia-
bility. Supra note 2, at 95. Tis provision says: "[t]he trustee may recover from prop-
erty securing an allowed secured claim the reasonable, necessary costs and expenses
of preserving, or disposing of, such property to the extent of any benefit to the holder
of such claim." 11 U.S.C. § 506(c) (1993). The EPA has adopted this position.
Cosetti & Friedman, supra note 2, at 96. One authority adeptly summarizes the prob-
lem with targeting secured creditors in any bankruptcy situation:
Creditors of a bankrupt may be divided into two broad classes, secured cred-
itors and unsecured creditors. The former are distinguishable from the latter
because they, in addition to having a contractual right to repayment, also
have a recogmzable property interest in the collateral. That property inter-
est, be it in personal or real property, is afforded protection under the Fifth
Amendment.
Richard B. Paige, In re Quanta Resources Corp.. Bankruptcy Policy v. Environmental
Interests; A Polluted Judicial Theory, 59 AM. BANKR. LI. 357, 380 (1985). See also
United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 82 (1982) (retroactive application
of Section 522(f)(2) of the Code would be a destruction of the property rights of
secured creditors and thus, an unconstitutional "taking").
53. Cosetti & Friedman recognize that "the concept of 'benefit' to the secured
creditor [a necessary condition to avail oneself of Section 506(c) of the Code] is nar-
rowly interpreted." Cosetti & Friedman supra note 2 at 96. The requirements for a
successful showing of "benefit" are stringent. First, "the trustee must demonstrate
in quantifiable terms that funds were expended which directly protected and pre-
served the collateral." Id. (citing In re Sonoma V, 24 B.R. 600, 603 (Bankr. 9th Cir.
1982). Also, the "claimant has the burden of showing that but for the costs expended,
the property would yield less to the creditor." Id. (citing Brookfield Prod. Credit
Ass'n v. Borron, 738 F.2d 951, 952-53 (8th Cir. 1984)). Besides these obstacles to the
agencies, one court actually authorized the secured creditor to disavow possession of
the portion of the collateral that was worthless and an environmental liability. Id.
(citing In re T.P Long Chem., Inc., 45 B.R. 278, 288 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985)).
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With the relevant parties now depicted, and the issues brought to
the forefront, the stage is set to describe a case that presented the
Supreme Court with the classic problems inherent m an abandonment
of polluted property by a Chapter 7 trustee: Midlantic National Bank
v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection.
III. THE DEBACLE OF MIDLANTIC
A. The Facts
Quanta Resources Corporation (Quanta) stored and processed
waste oil at several locations. 4 The New Jersey Department of Envi-
ronmental Protection (NJDEP) discovered in June 1981 that Quanta
had violated a provision of the operating permit for its Edgewater,
New Jersey facility by accepting more than 400,000 gallons of oil con-
taming polychlormated biphenyls (PCBs), highly toxic carcinogens. 55
This dangerous mixture was stored in deteriorating vats, and there-
fore, leakage into the Hudson River and resultant contamination was
a serious threat.56 In addition, a mere 500 yards from the site was a
budding, middle-class residential neighborhood known as the New
Jersey Palisades.57 Any fire on the Quanta premises could lead to the
release of poisonous fumes, subjecting thousands of people to grave
danger.
Quanta was simultaneously accepting more than 70,000 gallons of
PCB-laden waste oil at its Long Island City facility, storing it in rot-
ting, leaking containers. 58 It is important to note that like the New
Jersey property, the New York land was subject to liens far exceeding
its present value.59
Negotiations between Quanta and the NJDEP had begun for the
cleanup of the New Jersey site when Quanta filed a petition for reor-
ganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in October
1981.60 The NJDEP then issued an order requiring cleanup, and
Quanta responded by converting the action to a liquidation proceed-
ing under Chapter 7.61
Unable to sell the Long Island City site, undoubtedly because of its
environmental liabilities, the Chapter 7 trustee notified the creditors
and the Bankruptcy Court that he intended to abandon the New York
property under Section 554 of the Bankruptcy Code.62 There was no
denial that the circumstances fit perfectly into the statute's explicit
54. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 496-97.
55. Id. at 497.
56. Cosetti & Friedman, supra note 2, at 69.
57. Id.
58. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 497.
59. Cosetti & Friedman, supra note 2, at 69-70.
60. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 497
61. Id.
62. Id.
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requirements for abandonment, given the fact that the encumbrances
and anticipated cleanup costs vastly exceeded the property's value
subsequent to cleanup. The City and State of New York vehemently
objected.63 First, they argued that the trustee had the obligation to
comply with existing laws and orders by using all assets of the estate to
remove the hazardous wastes from the facility.64 The government en-
tities were also aware that the trustee intended to carry out a post-
abandonment removal of the 24-hour guard service and shut off the
fire suppression system, leaving the public vulnerable to vandals and
fire.65 Thus, New York's second argument was that abandonment
would contravene public health and safety.
66
The Bankruptcy Court, which approved the abandonment, rejected
both of these arguments.67 The court emphasized that the state and
federal environmental authorities were better suited to protect the
public health than the trustee or the creditors.68 With the signature of
the judge fresh on the abandonment order, New York cleaned up the
site at a price of $2.5 million.69 The District Court followed by af-
firming the Bankruptcy Court and an appeal was made to the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals.70
At the Edgewater site, the trustee was preparing for another aban-
donment. He had ignored the leaking tanks and sold off all the anti-
spill equipment.71 His subsequent abandonment petition was ap-
proved by the Bankruptcy Court in May of 1983 over the NJDEP's
heated objection.72 Soon thereafter, the NJDEP joined New York
with a direct appeal to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.73
The Third Circuit reversed the Bankruptcy Court in separate judg-
ments, holding that both decisions to permit abandonment were m
63. Id. at 498.
64. Id. The City and State argued that the Code had stnpped Quanta of its assets
under § 541 so it could obviously provide no protection of the wastes at the site. In re
Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d 912, 914 (3d Cir. 1984). Therefore, they con-
tended, abandonment by the trustee would constitute a "disposal" of hazardous waste
within the meaning of New York's environmental laws. Michael L. O'Shaughnessy,
Note, Bankruptcy Trustee's Abandonment of Burdensome Estate Property and State
Environmental Protection Laws, 55 U. Ci. L. REv. 853, 854 n.11 (1987) (citing In re
Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d at 914)). New York law says "[n]o person shall
dispose of hazardous wastes without authorization." Id at 854 n.11 (citing N.Y.
ENVT. CONSERV. LAw § 27-0914(2) (McKinney 1984)).






71. Cosetti & Friedman, supra note 2, at 71.
72. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 498-99.
73. Id. at 499.
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error.74 The Supreme Court granted certiorari "to determine whether
the Court of Appeals properly construed section 554."75
B. The Holding
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the Third Circuit's
denial of abandonment.76 For the majority, the issue was straightfor-
ward: "[w]hether section 554(a) of the Bankruptcy Code... autho-
rizes a trustee in bankruptcy to abandon property in contravention of
state laws or regulations that are reasonably designed to protect the
public's health or safety. ' 77 The answer, although neither resounding
nor decisive, was "no."
Justice Powell argued that before the enactment of the Code in
1978, the trustee's abandonment power was restricted by a "judicially
developed doctrine" created to protect particular state and federal in-
terests.78 Comprising the centerpiece of tis doctrine were three "pre-
Code" cases: In re Ottenheimer,79 In re Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 0
and In re Lewis Jones, Inc. " According to Justice Powell, these three
authorities, each prohibiting abandonment by a trustee if it would re-
sult in a violation of a certain state or federal law, were implicitly in-
corporated into what is now section 554(a) of the Code.'
Of course, there was the "minor" problem that the statute didn't
explicitly provide for this limitation on a trustee's discretion, but that
didn't stop the majority. They proffered a "normal rule" of statutory
construction: "[ilf Congress intends for legislation to change the inter-
pretation of a judicially created concept, it makes that intent spe-
cific." 3 The logical outgrowth of such an assumption, in the eyes of
the Court, was that if Congress had truly desired to grant the trustee
an exemption from the common-law abandonment restriction, it
would have said so expressly in the statute.84
The majority next tried their hand at reconciling section 554 with
section 362, the automatic stay provision. Section 362 contains a
74. Id. at 499-500 (describing the reasoning of the two Quanta cases).
75. Id. at 500 (citation omitted).
76. Id. at 507.
77. Id. at 496 (citation and footnote omitted).
78. Id. at 500.
79. 198 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1952) (refusing to grant trustee permission to abandon
barges in violdtion of a federal navigation statute).
80. 129 F.2d 1 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 683 (1942) (trustee's attempted
abandonment of the operation of a branch railway line is invalidated as being in con-
travention of a controlling state statute).
81. 1 B.C.D. (CRR) 277 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1974) (public interest precluded the
trustees of three bankrupt utilities from abandoning potentially hazardous manholes,
vents and steam pipes).
82. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 501.




number of exceptions, such as the police power exceptions found in
sections 362(b)(4) and (b)(5).85 Some authorities argue that if Con-
gress wanted to solidify a police power exception to abandonment, it
would have done so m the same manner as it did with section 362: by
putting it in the words of the statute. Justice Powell rejected this rea-
soning and argued that a comparison of the two provisions would be
misguided.8 6 The exceptions to section 362, said Powell, were devel-
oped because courts were unduly expanding the scope of the stay be-
yond its anticipated and intended boundsY Section 554 did not need
any congressional "help" because abandonment had already been
subject to judicial limitations and therefore, explicit restrictions would
have been superfluous.88
Pulling the Court out of the friendly confines of Title 11, Powell
articulated a justification based on the "intent" of 28 U.S.C. § 959(b).
In essence, the statute provides that a trustee must "operate and man-
age the property in Ins possession.., according to the requirements of
the valid laws of the State in which the property is situated .... 89 It
was admitted by the Court that the statute did not apply in the aban-
donment context and didn't even apply to a liquidation proceeding.90
85. The automatic stay language of the exceptions is stated below:
(a) Except as provided m subsection (b) of the section, a petition filed under
section 301, 302, or 303 of this title operates as a stay, applicable to all
entities, of
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employ-
ment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action and proceeding
against the debtor that was or could have commenced before commence-
ment of this case under this title, or to recover a claim against the debtor
that arose before commencement of the case under this title;
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate, of
a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under this title
(b) The filing of a petition under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title. does
not operate as a stay .
(4) under subsection (a)(1) of this section, of the commencement or contin-
uation of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such
governmental unit's police power or regulatory power,
(5) under subsection (a)(2) of this section, of the enforcement of a judg-
ment, other than a money judgment, obtained m an action or proceeding by
a governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit's police or regulatory
power
11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1)-(2), (b)(4)-(5) (1992) (emphasis added). For a little clarifica-
tion, "police power" is simply "the power of states to regulate the conduct of their
citizens." Sward, supra note 24, at 414. According to Sward, few would argue that a
"core of legislation designed to protect the public health and safety" is beyond the
scope of the power. I& at 415.
86. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 504.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) (1988).
90. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 505. One article has compiled an impressive list of cases
showing that "[c]ourts have split as to whether 28 U.S.C.A. Section 959(b) applies to a
debtor or to a trustee that is liquidating, as opposed to operating, the debtor's busi-
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However, the existence of such a provision indicated that Congress
"did not intend for the Bankruptcy Code to pre-empt all state laws
that otherwise constrain the exercise of a trustee's powers."91
Remaining outside the sphere of the Code per se, the Court argued
that the existence of federal environmental legislation such as CER-
CLA reflected Congress' ovemding "goal of protecting the environ-
ment against toxic pollution."' In light of Congress' deep concern for
the environment and the threats posed by hazardous waste disposal,
the majority found it hard to believe that legislators destroyed the
"longstanding" restrictions on abandonment by enacting section
554(a).93
The Court concluded the opimon with an admonition that "Con-
gress did not intend for section 554(a) to pre-empt all state and local
laws" and its terse holding: "a trustee [in bankruptcy] may not aban-
don property in contravention of a state statute or regulation that is
reasonably designed to protect the public health or safety from identi-
fied hazards." 94 An affirmative obligation was even placed on the
shoulders of bankruptcy courts: "[a] Bankruptcy Court does not have
the power to authorize an abandonment without formulating condi-
tions that will adequately protect the public's health and safety."95
Problematically, there was a now-famous footnote:
[t]ls exception to the abandonment power vested in the trustee by
section 554 is a narrow one. It does not encompass a speculative or
indeterminate future violation of such laws that may stem from
abandonment. The abandonment power is not to be fettered by
laws or regulations not reasonably calculated to protect the public
health or safety from imminent and identifiable harm.9 6
Coming from a court that gives little attention to this esoteric area of
law, this last qualification is an exception to an exception that "ren-
ders both the ratio decidendi and the import of the Court's opinion
quite unclear. '97
ness." Mirsky et al., supra note 9, at 648-49 (citing m support of non-applicability to
Chapter 7 proceedings, e.g., In re Kaiser Steel Corp., 87 B.R. 662, 665 (Bankr. D.
Colo. 1988); In re Norwesco Dev. Corp., 68 B.R. 129 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1986); In re
Thomas Solvent Co., 44 B.R. 83, 87-88 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1984) (dictum); contra In
re Wall Tube & Metal Prod. Co., 831 F.2d 118, 122 (6th Cir. 1987); In re Commercial
Oil Serv., Inc., 58 B.R. 311, 317 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986) (dictum); In re Charles
George Land Reclamation Trust, 30 B.R. 918, 921 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1983) (dicta)).
91. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 505.
92. Id (citing Chemical Mfrs. Assn. v. National Resources Defense Council, 470
U.S. 116, 143 (1985)).
93. Id. at 506-07
94. Id. at 507.
95. Id
96. Id. at 507 n.9.
97. Id. at 507.
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C. The Faulty Rationale
Regardless of whether the result is correct, there is no doubt that
the majority's reasoning is fraught with inconsistencies and faulty legal
analysis. We are presented with a statute that expressly allows a
trustee to abandon if, after a cost-benefit calculation, it is determined
that the property is burdensome to the estate. There are no excep-
tions to the trustee's authority outlined in the language of the statute.
Some, such as Justice Scalia, believe that the language of any statute is
the sole manifestation of its true meaning.98 For Scalia then, analysis
of the abandonment provision of the Code ends at this point.99 It is
difficult, even for skeptics of strict constructiomsm, to ignore the un-
qualified language of section 544(a) unless other persuasive contradic-
tory authority exists. Of the possible alternatives or supplements that
one can rely on in pursuit of statutory meaning, none has garnered
more support or legitimacy than legislative history.1' ° For argument's
98. See Nicholas S. Zeppos, Justice Scalia's Textualism: The "New" New Legal
Process, 12 CARDozo L. Rnv. 1597, 1598 (1991). Zeppos summarizes Scalia's statu-
tory approach as follows:
[a]s part of this "new textualism" Justice Scalia has urged an abandonment
of the Court's traditional use of legislative history to interpret statutes. In
place of this historical or intentionalist approach, Justice Scalia has argued
that, generally speaking, the only legitimate source for interpretative gui-
dance in statutory cases is the text of the statute at issue, or related provi-
sions of enacted law which shed light on the meaning of the disputed text.
Id., see also Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring); see generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 U.C.L.A.
L. Rnv. 621 (1990). This methodology has been traditionally characterized as the
"plato meaning rule." Adam J. Wiensch, Note, The Supreme Court, Textualism, and
the Treatment of Pre-Bankruptcy Code Law, 79 GEo. L.J. 1831, 1834 (1991) ("The
plain meaning rule requires that 'the meaning of the statute must, in the first instance,
be sought in the language in which the act is framed, and if that is plain the sole
function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms' ") (quoting Cammetti v.
United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917)). Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals is another prominent member of the "textualist" school. See Frank
Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. C--. L. Rnv 533, 548-49 (1983) (supporting
strict construction to prevent legislatures from legislating after they are "dead").
99. One commentator perceptively adds that Scalia and the proponents of the
plain meaning rule do not totally ignore legislative history. They will stray in selected
cases
[b]ecause the [plain meaning] rule is applied only when the result is not "at
odds" with the intention of the drafters, the Court would be remiss if it failed
to look to the legislative history to check the result of their application of the
rule against the legislative history's indication of congressional intent.
Wiensch, supra note 98, at 1837. In other words, statutory construction will not begin
and end with the text if the rule would create "an absurd result." Id. at 1837 n.38.
100. Patricia Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Constru-
ing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L.
REv. 277,306-08 (1990) (legislative history, manifested in the committee reports, rep-
resents the will of Congress); Kenneth N. Klee and Frank A. Merola, Ignoring Con-
gressional Intent: Eight Years of Judicial Legislation, 62 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 3 (1988)
("[r]esort to legislative history is the best method by which a court can peer into the
drafters' minds."). Of course, "it is important to understand that certain documents
are more conclusive of legislative intent than others." Id. at 4. Klee and Merola as-
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sake, we should adopt the most liberal view, such as that of Justice
Frankfurter: "[i]f the purpose of construction is the ascertainment of
meaning, nothing that is logically relevant should be excluded."'' °
As mentioned earlier, many believe that the legislative history of
section 554 is not helpful in determining the permissible parameters of
a trustee's authority to abandon environmentally-impaired estate
property.1°2 The Court assumes as much in Midlantic. One commen-
tator put forth an interesting explanation for congressional silence on
the issue. The starting point of "environmental consciousness," he
stated, was the Love Canal incident m mid-1978.10 3 By studying peri-
odical indices, he determined that pollution emanating unabated from
waste facilities was not recognized as a major problem until the mid-
to-late 1980's.1' 4 Given these circumstances, "it is thus a fair question
whether Congress ever contemplated use of section 554(a) by a bank-
ruptcy trustee m Midlantic's unusual circumstances, a situation which
evidently had not been presented before passage of the 1978 Act."' 0
It can be argued, however, that Congress was aware of how the
Code would interact with environmental enforcement. For example,
in the legislative history of the (b)(4) exception to the automatic stay,
Congress states that:
[t]hus, where a governmental unit is suing a debtor to prevent or
stop violation of fraud, environmental protection, consumer protec-
tion, safety, or similar police or regulatory laws, or attempting to fix
damages for violation of such a law, the action or proceeding is not
stayed under the automatic stay.106
This language supports the premise that Congress did consider envi-
ronmental impact when they enacted the Code. In the case of the
automatic stay, Congress made a calculated decision that the environ-
mental interests of the state and federal government would subsume
bankruptcy ends. Apparently, Congress utilized the same variables
when constructing section 554, but came away with the opposite con-
clusion. A plausible scenario is that because it was obvious to Con-
gress to hold bankruptcy policy in the abandonment context
sert that for bankruptcy, "the joint statements are more authoritative than the com-
mittee reports." 1d.
101. OrTo J. HETZEL, LEGISLAThvE LAW AND PROCESS: CASES AND MATERIALS
175 (1980).
102. See, e.g., Silber, supra note 2, at 880 n.74; Lisa A. Waisbren, Comment, Aban-
donment of Toxic Wastes Under the Bankruptcy Code, 71 MARO. L. REV 353, 362
(1988).
103. Ld.; see also Mirsky et al., supra note 9, at 626; Jack Lewis, Superfund, RCRA,
and UST. The Clean-up Threesome; Love Canal Legacy - Where are We Nowp, EPA
JoURNAL, July, 1991 - August 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omm file.
104. O'Shaughnessy, supra note 64, at 868 n.102.
105. Id.
106. S. REP. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5838; H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 343 (1978), re-
printed in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6299 (emphasis added).
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paramount to any other concerns, including environmental safety, it
found prolonged debate to be an unnecessary waste of time. Thus, a
paucity of legislative history did not reflect a lack of contemplation,
but rather a lack of need for any contemplation.
As legislative history joins the text in supporting a pro-abandon-
ment, anti-Midlantic stance, it becomes prudent to move a level down
in the interpretive hierarchy to the common law. The view of the
Midlantic Court is that three pre-Code cases are dispositive proof that
a legal consensus existed supporting the restriction of a trustee's aban-
donment power. However, as Justice Rehnquist implies in his pejora-
tive dissent, 0 7 three disparate cases concurring on a general legal
principle sounds more like a coincidence than a production of law
etched in stone. Also, Justice Rehnquist is again persuasive when he
castigates the majority for selecting cases that are factually distin-
guishable from everything in representing this well-settled excep-
tion.'08 Justice Powell's argument in this vein is tenuous at best.
In yet another line of analysis, it is possible to utilize what one com-
mentator calls the "knew how to" rule.109 This rule is based on the
presumption that "where Congress includes particular language in one
section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act,...
Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or
exclusion." 1 0 Throughout the Bankruptcy Code, there is a plethora
of exceptions to the general rules. To name a few, there are the dis-
charge exceptions outlined in section 523(a),"' the avoidance excep-
tions delineated in section 547(c)," 2 and the exceptions to the
automatic stay set out in section 362(b). 13
In fact, as Justice Rehnquist intimates, section 554 is one of the few
mandates in the Code without an exception. 1 4 Clearly, Congress
"knew how to draft an exception covering the 'exercise' of certain po-
lice powers when it wanted to""' as well as "how to draft a qualified
abandonment provision.""' 6 To those that place great weight on the
107. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 510-12 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
108. Id., see also Wiensch, supra note 98, at 1842 n.81 ("The Court's claim that
there were 'well-recognized restrictions on a trustee's abandonment power' is not en-
tirely compelling.").
109. Id at 1839.
110. Id. (quoting United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 474 F.2d 720,722 (5th Cir. 1972)).
111. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1988).
112. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c) (1988).
113. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b) (1988).
114. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 513 (Rehnqmst, C.J., dissenting).
115. Id.
116. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1170(a)(2) (1993), permitting the abandonment of rail-
road lines only if "consistent with the public interest."); see also Silber, supra note 2,
at 881 n.89 ("Congress could have drafted a qualified abandonment provision had it
so intended. [T]he Bankruptcy Code contains a special provision that the aban-
donment of railroad lines be consistent with the public interest."). Silber himself,
though, admits that the railroad abandonment provision should not carry much
weight here. This is due to the fact that "[b]ecause of the special role played by the
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rule's significance, all of this would indicate a meaningful pattern.
When Congress wants to create exceptions to express language in the
Bankruptcy Code, it sets it out in the Code itself. Contrary to Justice
Powell's belief, it is not Congress' practice in the Code to leave out an
exception because it assumes all will know about its reliance on an
arcane, judicially created one. Section 554 has no exceptions because
Congress wanted it that way.
The Court was fully aware that its soft response to the persuasive
"knew how to" argument would not be sufficient. To bolster its al-
ready weak foundation, the majority devoted the last portion of its
opinion to a peculiar canon of statutory construction that might be
called "spirit bootstrapping." As explained above, Powell argues that
28 U.S.C. § 959(b), coupled with the existence of federal environmen-
tal laws, reflects Congress' desire not to disregard governmental inter-
ests in the formulation of a bankruptcy process." 7 The "spirit" of
these provisions, he implies, should be bootstrapped onto all congres-
sional acts, including the Bankruptcy Code and its abandonment pro-
vision. This is wishful thinking on Powell's part. When interpreting
the intent behind a piece of legislation, the statute must be handled
individually and in its own vacuum. This is because Congress always
has a different goal in mind when it passes a specific law. Sometimes
public safety is advanced, or at times fairness may be the desired end.
Other laws may be designed simply to further the lot of particular
interest groups. To say that one law's apparent intent reflects an
across-the-board congressional intent, or that some statutes (i.e.,
CERCLA, RCRA) are inherent auxiliaries of another (i.e., the Bank-
ruptcy Code) is a distortion of how our legislative process works.
Nevertheless, another somewhat desperate attempt by the Midlantic
majority to rationalize its holding falls by the wayside.
Whether or not one looks at the text of the statute, its legislative
history, common law precedent, or even its relationship to other pro-
visions in the Code, it is clear that the majority's reasoning is flawed
on all fronts. Abandonment conditioned only by the "burdensome"
or "inconsequential benefit" test expressly provided for in section
554(a) should be the unequivocal rule. The primary reason why it is
not is because once again, the Supreme Court has used its all-powerful
discretion to legislate public policy from the bench."' Clearly, the
Interstate Commerce Comrmssion in the industry, the railroad provisions are
unique." Id.
117 Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 505-06.
118. Adam Wiensch argues persuasively that whatever the rationale was behind the
Midlantic decision, it wasn't a desire to be faithful to the text. In his note, he states
that "[t]he [Supreme] Court has been remarkably consistent m deciding Bankruptcy
Code cases in that, almost without exception, it has used a textualist approach for
statutory interpretation." Wiensch, supra note 97, at 1832. There have been two sig-
nificant departures from the practice: Midlantic and Kelly v. Robinson. L at 1832-
33. In each, says Wiensch, the Court was presented with a fact pattern that necessi-
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Court was appalled at the egregious conduct of Quanta's bankruptcy
trustee and the devil-may-care attitude of the bankruptcy court that
approved the abandonments. The wording of one footnote reflects
this disbelief and dismay:
[t]he trustee was not required to take even relatively minor steps to
reduce imminent danger, such as security fencing, drainage and dik-
ing repairs, sealing deteriorating tanks, and removing explosive
agents. Moreover, the trustee's abandonment at both sites aggra-
vated already existing dangers by halting security measures that pre-
vented public entry, vandalism, and fire . . The 470,000 gallons of
highly toxic and carcinogemc waste oil in unguarded, deteriorating
containers "present risks of explosion, fire, contamination of water
supplies, destruction of natural resources, and injury, genetic dam-
age, or death through personal contact." 119
Apparently, the Court believed that allowing abandonment in this sit-
uation would undoubtedly send the wrong message to polluters that
bankruptcy and abandonment was the answer to all their legal and
fiscal troubles. Creating an implicit exception, even if not grounded in
law, was something that the majority had to do to prevent many a
sleepless ight.
Perhaps symbolism and deterrence were not the only public policy
components in the formula. The Court might have injected their be-
lief that New York and New Jersey in Midlantic were "involuntary
creditors" who were acting not only for themselves but for the citizens
in a de facto class action suit against Quanta. 2 ' The involuntary credi-
tor should get a priority over other creditors, by having the trustee
comply with the environmental laws using estate funds. Tins is sound
policy because unlike other unsecured creditors, the involuntary credi-
tors had risk unwillingly thrust upon them.'2'
On the other hand, each justice in the majority could have individu-
ally decided that the creditors, rather than the public, should have to
pay for the cleanup because they are better able to quantify and dis-
tribute the risk. 22 It is also possible that the Court was silently apply-
mg a balancing of the equities approach contemplated in NLRB v.
Bildisco & Bildisco,' whereby public health would be balanced
tated and lent itself to a holding addressing public policy concerns. Id. at 1843-44.
The umque nature of the circumstances in these particular cases is reflected by the
Court's immediate retreat back to textualism m its next bankruptcy case. Id. at 1847-
48 (making reference to United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, 489 U.S. 235 (1989)).
119. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 499 n.3.
120. See Moms G. Shanker, A Bankruptcy Superfund for Some Super Creditors:
From Ohio to Midlantic and Beyond, 61 AM. BANKR. L.J. 185, 192-93 (1987).
121. Id.
122. See Roger D. Colton et al., Seven-Cum-Eleven: Rolling the Toxic Dice in the
U.S. Supreme Court, 14 B.C. ENVTL. A'Fi. L. REv 345, 375-76 (1987).
123. 465 U.S. 513 (1984) (applying "balancing the equities" approach to allow a
company to reject its collective-bargaining agreement with a labor umon).
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against the economic interests of the debtor and its creditors.
124
Whatever public policy factor came into play to produce the ultimate
holding, it will not change the fact that Congress should make the laws
and judges should interpret them. As Judge Cornelia Kennedy of the
Sixth Circuit has stated: "policy decisions are the responsibility of
Congress, which could easily modify the Bankruptcy Code....
Midlantic and its policy-driven reasomng is wrong.
IV. JUDICIAL "SLEiGIrr OF HAND ''1126 ArER MIDLAI.tIC
Before 1986, courts often encountered the Midlantic problem. A
typical scenario would evolve as follows: a company would commit
environmental violations by failing to clean up hazardous wastes on its
property, and subsequently be charged with an order by an environ-
mental agency to clean up the waste. Instead of complying with the
order, the company would opt for a Chapter 7 liquidation and the
trustee, after reviewing the case, requests abandonment. In many in-
stances, courts allowed abandonment if the statutory requirements
were met. However, the Midlantic decision provided the courts with a
new interpretation. This approach was difficult to reconcile with the
plain meamng of section 554 of the Code, and many judicial commen-
tators believed that the Midlantic exception was an unjustified product
of emotion and public policy considerations. How would federal
judges be able to reconcile these concerns?
The answer is quite simple. Courts, after realizing the contradic-
tions created by Midlantic, used illusion and sleight of hand to mmni-
mize potential damage without vitiating the principal of stare decisis.
In doing so however, they have transformed a legitimate legal ele-
phant, Midlantic, into an inconsequential mouse.
A comparison of the fact patterns of cases involving a trustee's at-
tempted abandonment of hazardous waste reveals three common
threads. First, in each there has been an intial determination that the
polluted property was "burdensome" or of "inconsequential value and
benefit to the estate" and therefore had satisfied the facial require-
ments of section 554(a).127 Second, there has been some finding that
the property is in violation of environmental regulations or statutes, or
abandonment of the property would run contrary to these prohibi-
124. See Joharnsen, supra note 49, at 226-27 (outlining the Bildisco test). Achiev-
mg "equity" is something that is invoked frequently in bankruptcy cases because
bankruptcy courts are courts of equity. Richard B. Paige, In re Quanta Resources
Corp.. Bankruptcy Policy v. Environmental Interests; A Polluted Judicial Theory, 59
Am. BANKR. LJ. 357, 368 (1985) ("The bankruptcy court must weigh the equities in
light of the goals which the Bankruptcy Code seeks to advance.").
125. United States v. Whizco, 841 F.2d 147, 151 n.5 (6th Cir. 1988).
126. O'Shaughnessy, supra note 64, at 867.
127. See, e.g., In re Oklahoma Ref. Co., 63 B.R. 562 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1986)
("From the evidence it is plain that the property is burdensome and of inconsequen-
tial or no value to the estate.").
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tions.' 2 Third, and most significantly, none of the cases have come
close to duplicating the overwhelming threat to public health and
safety that was found in Midlantic 2 9 There have been a few anoma-
lies, such as the case where five tons of extremely hazardous material
was buried while in an uncontrolled condition1 30 or where deadly cya-
mde gas was escaping into the atmosphere.1 3 ' But for the most part,
the post-Midlantic cases addressed situations involving abandoned
plants that had at one time or another generated toxic substances as a
necessary part of production, such as oil refineries,' 32 a fertilizer
plant, 33 and for some reason, a number of electroplating production
facilities,'13 but no environmental time-bomb. The fact that most of
the courts addressing the abandonment issue are starting at the same
factual baseline is important. It shows that the differing results that
have come out of Midlantic are not as much a reflection of the pecu-
liar facts of each particular case as they are a by-product of judges'
different perceptions of what the abandonment standard articulated
by Midlantic really was.
A. Taking a Step Back: What Did Midlantic Really Say?
To say that Justice Powell's Midlantic opinion was incomprehensible
would be unfair. Powell left no doubt that if the act of abandonment
would prospectively violate (or the property itself is already in viola-
tion of) environmental orders and laws, Midlantic's mandate kicks
128. See, e.g., In re Shore Co., 134 B.R. 572, 578 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1991) ("[T]his
Court is convinced that m all likelihood the property is in violation of the laws of the
State of Texas as well as relevant federal environmental laws."); In re Better-Brite
Plating, Inc., 105 B.R. 912, 917 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1989) [hereinafter Better-Brite 1]
(the Wisconsin law mandating cleanup of a waste site would also be violated by the
trustee's proposed abandonment); In re Stevens, 68 B.R. 774, 782 (D. Me. 1987) (if
trustee abandoned, the act would constitute a violation of "Maine law regulating the
disposal of hazardous waste."); see also In re FCX, Inc., 96 B.R. 49, 54-55 (Bankr.
E.D.N.C. 1989) (the Midlantie abandonment exception is triggered "whether there
have been violations of CERCLA or state environmental law."); In re Peerless Plat-
ing Co., 70 B.R. 943, 948 n.4 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987) ("Midlantic involved state
laws while the law m question here, CERCLA, is federal. However, that is not a
significant distinction.").
129. See, e.g., State of New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection v.
North American Products Acquisition Corp., 137 B.R. 8,12 (D.NJ. 1992) ("Unlike m
Midlantic, there is currently no security service at the premises, nor is there an alarm
system."); In re Anthony Ferrante & Sons, Inc., 119 B.R. 45, 49 (D.N.J. 1990) ("This
case, on the other hand, is not at all like Midlantic."); In re Franklin Signal Corp., 65
B.R. 268,274 n.9 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986) ("It is important to compare the facts of this
case to those in Midlantic."); Oklahoma Ref, 63 B.R. at 565 ("[A] factual comparison
of the two cases [this and Midlantic] is necessary.").
130. FCX, 96 B.R. at 49.
131. In re Peerless Plating Co., 70 B.R. 943 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987).
132. See, e.g., Leavell v. Karnes, 143 B.R. 212 (S.D. In. 1990); Shore, 134 B.R. at
572; Oklahoma Ref., 63 B.R. at 562.
133. See In re Smith-Douglass, Inc., 856 F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1988).
134. See, e.g., Better-Brite I, 105 B.R. at 912; Peerless Plating, 70 B.R. at 943.
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in.135 At that point, a three-prong test should be applied, with the
satisfaction of each prong a necessary prerequisite for an authorized
abandonment. It is not so much a test that places burdens of proof on
parties as it is a set of factors that the court will objectively evaluate m
making its decision.
First and foremost, the court must make a threshold determination.
Midlantic dictates that satisfaction of the cost-benefit test will never
be the only consideration when there is an accompanying violation of
environmental orders and laws, and that the trustee in these cases
must take some initial precautionary steps to prevent the aggrandize-
ment of any possible danger to the public. Such a view seems to be
bolstered by the fact that Justice Rehnquist, although disparaging
Powell's modification of the previously unqualified standard for aban-
donment, expressly advocates such measures: "in almost all cases, re-
quirmg the trustee to notify the relevant authorities before
abandoning-will give those authorities adequate opportunity to step in
and provide needed security " 36 This particular action on the
trustee's part is necessary to satisfy this "bare minimum" prong, but is
probably not sufficient.'37
The second component is an amalgam of various requirements set
forth by the majority, and should be called the "statutory non-oppres-
siveness" prong. When Powell and the Court state that "a trustee may
not abandon property in contravention of a state statute or regulation
that is reasonably designed to protect the public health and safety from
135. The relevant Midlantic phraseology has already been mentioned: "[a] trustee
[in bankruptcy] may not abandon property in contravention of a state statute . that
is reasonably designed to protect the public health or safety from identified hazards."
474 U.S. at 507. This author believes that a common sense reading of the language
will lead to the conclusion that if either of two conditions are present, application of
the Midlantic exception is warranted. First, and most obvious, Midlantic covers those
situations when the actual act of abandoning property saddled with hazardous waste
would run counter to state or federal environmental laws or regulations. For exam-
ple, there may be a state statute that says:
[a] person who possesses or controls a hazardous substance which is dis-
charged or who causes the discharge of a hazardous substance shall take the
actions necessary to restore the environment to the extent practicable and
mimnuze the harmful effects from the discharge to the air, lands or waters of
this state.
Wis. STAT. § 144.76(3) (1985). While property generating hazardous waste may not m
and of itself be m violation of any law, clearly here abandonment of the impacted
property without cleaning it up would be a violation. Second, if the trustee wishes to
abandon property that happens to be in a condition violative of environmental dic-
tates, but the actof abandonment does not violate any regulations, Midlantic is still
controlling. Let us say that there is a statute mandating that there should not be more
than 20 tons of solid or liquid waste on a piece of property at any one time. Property
on which 30 tons of this material is stored is in violation of the law, but abandonment
of this property m violation of the law is not necessarily barred.
136. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 515.
137 See, e.g., Oklahoma Ref, 63 B.R. at 564 (trustee drained tanks filled with
sludge, maintained fencing around the area where the waste was stored, and commis-
sioned an environmental status report); Franklin Signal, 65 B.R. at 273.
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identified hazards,"'38 that "abandonment power is not to be fettered
by laws or regulations not reasonably calculated to protect the public
health or safety from imminent and identifiable harm,"'13 9 and that
"without reaching the question whether certain state laws imposing
conditions on abandonment may be so onerous as to interfere with the
bankruptcy adjudication itself,"'140 they are clearly directing their at-
tack upon the nature of the environmental laws, not the nature of
harm that will trigger abandonment.' 4' This is a very important dis-
tinction. These general requirements of reasonableness for a police
power statute represent such a low threshold that almost every state,
local, and federal statute will pass muster. It is likely that in the broad
sense, the Court wanted to balance Federalism and Supremacy Clause
concerns, but whatever the reason, trustees desiring to abandon prop-
erty must ultimately look to the third prong for support.
The last prong is the "infringement" prong. As mentioned earlier,
the exception to the abandonment power "does not encompass a spec-
ulative or indeterminate future violation of such laws that may stem
from abandonment."' 42 This restriction on what is otherwise a com-
plete denial of an abandonment request in cases where environmental
laws are being violated is, again, a mere nuisance rather than an op-
pressive obstacle to government agencies. The language forbids the
enforcement of future infractions, not future harm, and it so happens
that most of the hazardous waste offenses will at the time the state
challenges abandonment be at the point where laws have been "offi-
cially" infringed.
Overall, the Midlantic exception is even more restrictive of a
trustee's discretion than one might gather from a cursory glance of the
opinion. It is true that there is an additional qualification in the opin-
ion that is quite amenable to the trustee: that the exception is "nar-
row.''143 However, "narrow" does not mean the same thing as "non-
138. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 507 (emphasis added).
139. Id. at 507 n.9 (emphasis added).
140. Id. at 507 (emphasis added). There has been some debate over the meaning of
the term "onerous" m this context. The Peerless court stated that "such a law might
be one that prohibited abandonment or the closing of a case even after an estate was
exhausted or one which permitted environmental authorities to completely usurp ad-
ministration of the case." 70 B.R. at 947 n.3 (citation omitted). According to Peerless,
a law winch would cause depletion of the estate if complied with would not be "oner-
ous." Id. at 947. Leonard Long has an even more expansive view. He argues that
the trustee should not be allowed to abandon property burdensome to the
estate under circumstances where the burden would shift to the debtor upon
the debtor's being revested with the property. Burdensome property of the
estate winch, as a result of being abandoned by the trustee, becomes burden-
some to the debtor is, in a very real sense, "onerous" to the bankruptcy
adjudication.
Supra note 47, at 104.
141. Long, supra note 47, at 106.
142. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 507 n.9 (emphasis added).
143. Id.
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existent." The Midlantic Court's continual emphasis on restricting the
trustee's abandonment power logically would be more weighty evi-
dence of its ultimate intent than one word mentioned in a conclusory
footnote.
B. What do a Majority of the Courts Want Midlantic to Say?
Most of the courts faced with a Chapter 7 abandonment attempt
have rejected the above analysis and liberally authorized abandon-
ment. A good way to introduce the approach of these courts is to
discuss a case that seems to place all of the relevant issues on the
table: In re Franklin Signal Corp."4
1. The Leader of the Pack
In this influential bankruptcy case, the Chapter 7 trustee made a
motion under section 554(a) to abandon fourteen drums of contami-
nated waste.145 The bankruptcy court granted the motion and imme-
diately went on the offensive, criticizing those who would give a
"literal" reading to the Midlantic holding.146 For the bankruptcy
court, "this strict reading of the Court's decision is [neither desirable
nor] what the majority intended to hold."' 47 The bankruptcy court
appeared to believe that Midlantic was only addressing those rare oc-
casions where the circumstances would be appallingly egregious.
Next, the court's interpretation of the Midlantic exception was put
forth: "[a trustee wishing to abandon] only needs to take adequate
precautionary measures to ensure that there is no imminent danger to
the public as a result of abandonment.' 1 48 The court mentioned two
examples. First, the trustee must conduct an investigation to deter-
mine the types of hazardous substances in the estate's possession, but
only if he reasonably believes that an abandonment will violate envi-
ronmental laws. 49 Second, the trustee is required to inform state and
federal environmental agencies of the status of the property and the
desire to abandon it.'5 0
The Franklin Signal court opmed that any evaluation of the aban-
donment problem should take five specific factors into account: "(1)
the imminence of danger to public health and safety, (2) the extent of
probable harm, (3) the amount and type of hazardous waste, (4) the
cost to bring the property into compliance with environmental laws,
and (5) the amount and type of funds available for cleanup." ''  Such
144. 65 B.R. 268 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986).
145. Id. at 269.
146. Id. at 271.
147. IdL
148. Id. at 272.
149. Id. at 273 n.8.
150. Id. at 273.
151. Id. at 272.
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a test, said the court, "will effectively balance the competing inter-
ests. ' 152 The court, in applying the Midlantic balancing test to the
facts, admitted that the drums were deteriorating and leakage was a
possibility, but refused to consider them a threat to public health,
15 3
since the state had not yet identified an imminent hazard to the pub-
lic.1 4 But what really tipped the balance in favor of abandonment,
emphasized the court, was the fact that there were no unencumbered
assets with which the trustee could comply with regulations and that
other parties had "an interest m disposing of the waste.'
' 55
In short, Franklin Signal stands for two propositions. First, it sigm-
fies that in some abandonment cases the issue "is not one of public
safety but one of money.' 56 Unfortunately, the public ultimately
foots the bill in these cases when cleanup becomes mumnent. Second,
this court considered Midlantic a compromise, "requir[ing] something
more than mere consideration of state law, but something less than
complete compliance.' 57
2. The Rest
The courts in this majority group 58 have touched upon bits and
pieces of the Franklin Signal analysis, but none have ever adopted all
of it as its own. Unbelievably, only two courts other than Franklin
Signal even mention that precautionary steps should be taken by the
Chapter 7 trustee before abandonment. 59 However, when they did
mention the first prong, they did so only to say that it should not be a
152. Id.
153. Id. at 273.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 274 ("The State of Wisconsin, the debtor, the landlord, and perhaps the
debtor's officers and directors may be responsible for the cleanup.").
156. Id. at 274 n.9.
157. Id. at 272 n.4. The court indirectly criticized two decisions at opposite ends of
the spectrum. In re Oklahoma Ref Co. held that "Midlantic requires the bankruptcy
court, m determining whether to permit abandonment, [to] take state environmental
laws and regulations into consideration." 63 B.R. at 565; see also Brian Cyril Salvagm,
Casenote, Bankruptcy Law; Environmental Law: Abandonment of Hazardous Waste
Sites in Bankruptcy-In re Oklahoma Refining Co., 63 Bankr. 562 (Bankr. W.D. Okla.
1986), 13 U. DAYToN L. REv. 511, 519-21 (1988) (attacking the court's overly broad
interpretation of Midlantic). In contrast, the inflexible Peerless Plating states that
"under Midlantic the Trustee could not abandon the Peerless site in violation of CER-
CLA." 70 B.R. at 947-48.
158. See New Mexico Env't Dep't v. Foulston (In re L.F Jenmngs Oil Co.), No. 93-
2001,1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 22656 (10th Cir. Sept. 8,1993); In re MCI, Inc., 151 B.R.
103 (E.D. Mich. 1992); In re Anthony Ferrante & Sons, Inc., 119 B.R. 45 (D.N.J.
1990); In re Doyle Lumber, Inc., 137 B.R. 197 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1992); New Jersey
Dep't of Envtl. Protection v. North Am. Products Acquisition Corp., 137 B.R. 8
(Bankr. D.NJ. 1992); In re Heldor Indus., Inc., 131 B.R. 578 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1991); In
re Shore Oil Co., 134 B.R. 572 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1991); In re Purco, Inc., 76 B.R. 523
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1987); Franklin Signal, 65 B.R. at 268; In re Oklahoma Ref. Co., 63
B.R. 562 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1986).
159. See Doyle Lumber, 137 B.R. at 203; Anthony Ferrante, 119 B.R. at 50.
1993]
248 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. V
mandatory requirement. The court in Doyle Lumber questioned
whether a Chapter 7 trustee has the knowledge to take these remedial
actions.' 60 In Anthony Ferrante, the "bare minimum" factor was de-
scribed as a rule that can be summarily waived if "abandonment will
not render the public health and safety inadequately protected.' 1
6
'
What these courts ignore is the fact that the Midlantic Court de-
manded that bankruptcy courts formulate "conditions that will ade-
quately protect the public's health and safety" before allowing an
abandonment. 162 Midlantic was clearly misinterpreted - whether in-
tentionally or not - to justify abandonment.
Of all the factors articulated in Franklin Signal, none has been em-
braced by the majority cases more than "imminence of danger to the
public health and safety."'1 63 The catch phrase coined in Shore is typi-
cal: "a trustee's right to abandon environmentally impacted estate
property is limited only by the precondition that the trustee remediate
any imminent and identifiable danger present on the property pro-
posed to be abandoned."' 64
Reliance on this standard in determining whether abandonment by
a Chapter 7 trustee should be authorized is wrong. As explained
above, Midlantic did not mention "imminent" in the same breath as
the harm that would accompany an abandonment. "Imminent" harm
was an essential qualification of the second prong; a statute must be
designed to address "imminent and identifiable harm" before a state
160. 137 B.R. at 203 ("[T]us court has reservations regarding the ability of a Chap-
ter 7 trustee to perform identification and remediation procedures like those re-
quested by the Commonwealth.").
161. 119 B.R. at 50 (quoting Purco, 76 B.R. at 533).
162. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 507.
163. Franklin Signal, 65 B.R. at 272. See, e.g., L.F Jennings, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS
22656, at *9 ("[B]efore abandonment of a property can violate Midlantic the property
must represent an immediate and identifiable harm to public health or safety.") (em-
phasis added); MCI, 151 B.R. at 108 (asking "whether the property constitutes an
imminent threat to the health and safety of the public") (emphasis added); Heldor,
131 B.R. at 588 ("Midlantic created a narrow exception to the abandonment
power involving cases m which abandonment would aggravate imminent and identifi-
able dangers to the public health or safety.") (emphasis added); Anthony Ferrante, 119
B.R. at 49 (abandonment allowed if "the violation caused by abandonment . would
not create a risk of imminent and identifiable harm.") (emphasis added); Purco, 76
B.R. at 533 (must show that "public health and safety are not adequately protected"
or that there is a "clear and imminent danger" or that there exists a "great risk of
harm or threat to public safety, either immediate or in the foreseeable future"). It
should be acknowledged that the third prong of the Midlantic test, "speculative or
future violation," has dissolved into virtual nothingness. 474 U.S. at 507 n.9. The
Anthony Ferrante court briefly mentioned it, but then proceeded to analyze how "im-
minence" would be interpreted. 119 B.R. at 49.
164. 134 B.R. at 578 (emphasis added); see also In re Rancourt, 144 B.R. 601 n.1
(Bankr. D.N.H. 1992) ("imminent" risk means "actual present identifiable harm," not
the "possibility or threat of a risk to the public health and welfare which may materi-
alize m the future from existing conditions although there is no present threat.").
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or federal agency could use its violation as a green light to halt aban-
donment of polluted property.1
65
To complicate the already confused situation, still other courts have
thrown another obstacle into the path of government agencies trying
to enforce cleanup before abandonment. Besides a showing that there
is "imminent and identifiable harm" to the public, states must prove
that the "abandonment will not aggravate the potential for harm to
the public."'1 66 The origin of this "aggravation" phrase is footnote 3 of
the Midlantic decision, where the Court expressed its dismay at the
trustee's pre-abandonment activity.' 67 Whether or not this descriptive
footnote is a holding of the Court, the fact remains that this standard
is inherently flawed. It is founded on the premise that only a change
in the status quo will warrant a stoppage of abandonment. What hap-
pens if the status quo is imminent death and destruction? Are these
courts willing to say that as long as the trustee is able to show that the
harm will remain at an unchanging "possibly deadly" level that aban-
donment will be authorized? Even these courts would have difficulty
justifying such a decision. Having a "change in the status quo" re-
quirement without having a plan to deal with an already heinous sta-
tus quo is incomprehensible. 68
What constitutes "imminent and identifiable harm" for these
courts? For the majority group, a violation of a controlling environ-
mental statute has not constituted the requisite harm. 6 9 The problem
is that these courts don't even know themselves what will satisfy this
165. One commentator also falls prey to the same misinterpretation as the judici-
ary. He criticizes the decision in Oklahoma Refining for substituting an "immediate
and menacing harm" standard for the Midlantic "imminent and identifiable" thresh-
old. Salvagni, supra note 157, at 517-19. Although making the erroneous assumption
that the Midlantic Court was talking about "imnunent and identifiable" with regard to
harm, his belief that the particular words chosen by the Court have dispositive signifi-
cance is similar to the approach advocated here. The idea that words have meaning in
the context of Midlantic is something that Perkins finds "weak and unpersuasive."
Perkins, supra note 2, at 1578 n.171.
166. Shore, 134 B.R. at 579 (emphasis added); see also North American Prod, 137
B.R. at 12 ("[flf the bankruptcy court finds that abandonment will not aggravate the
threat of harm to the health and safety of the public or create some additional harm,
abandonment should be permitted.") (emphasis added); Heldor, 131 B.R. at 588
("Midlantic created a narrow exception to the abandonment power involving cases
in which abandonment would aggravate imminent and identifiable dangers to the pub-
lic health or safety.") (emphasis added); Anthony Ferrante, 119 B.R. at 50 (abandon-
ment must "aggravate any danger to the public") (emphasis added).
167. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 499 n.3 ("[T]he trustee's abandonment at both sites ag-
gravated already existing dangers by halting security measures that prevented public
entry, vandalism and fire.") (emphasis added).
168. See generally James W Bentz, Creditors' Rights When Federal Bankruptcy
Laws Conflict With State Environmental Agency Enforcement Powers After Midlantic
National Bank, 48 U. Prrr. L. REv. 879, 900-02 (1987) (recogruzing the dangers in
confusing the "action" and "rest" components of the status quo).
169. See, e.g., Shore, 134 B.R. at 578 ("[Vliolation of state and federal environmen-
tal laws is not enough to limit the trustee's powers of abandonment "). Even a
court that applies a more strict, literal reading of Midlantic is in concurrence. FCX, 96
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standard. What they have craftily adopted is a "negative" analysis,
pointing out those conditions that will show them when there is not animminent harm to the public. One of these factors is an environmen-
tal agency's lack of vigorous action and persistence m enforcing the
potential violation.17 If, for example, the EPA knew about the haz-
ardous waste stored on the property of the debtor and for eight years
didn't seek to enforce its administrative order until bankruptcy was
filed, this would indicate to these courts that there was no minment
danger and abandonment was warranted. 171 In a worst-case scenario
such as this, non-enforcement on the part of agencies is influential.
One court, in dealing with an analogous situation, has heartily
disagreed:
[t]he court is also aware that, despite learning of the problem in
May of 1986, neither the EPA nor the State of North Carolina com-
menced any enforcement action until after the notice for abandon-
ment was filed [in December of 1988]. While that may be some
evidence that the governments did not consider this site to pose an
immediate danger, it certainly does not decide the matter. EPA and
state environmental agencies necessarily must proceed deliberately
in such matters, but even when there is an inordinate delay, the
court must find an immediate danger to public health if in fact one
exists.172
This court presents the correct approach. In most cases, the fact that
the environmental agencies have not actively pursued enforcement or
tried to correct the problem themselves often has little to do with
threats to public health, and a lot to do with money.'1 3 The EPA and
the state agencies are aware of how bankruptcy works, and know that
if they clean up a site and the owner/debtor subsequently files a Chap-
ter 7, it is likely that their costs will be classified as an unsecured
B.R. at 54 ("[W]hether there have been violations of CERCLA or state environmen-
tal law is not the test when the issue is abandonment.").
170. See L.F. Jennings, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 22656, at *11 (the New Mexico Envi-
ronment Department [NMED] failed to place the hazardous waste site on its list of
contaminated sites, "indicating that the NMED was not considering further testing or
investigation of the site . "); MCI, 151 B.R. at 108 ("INleither the EPA nor the
DNR, in 1991, opposed the trustee abandomng the site [so] [a] reasonable infer-
ence from this is that the agencies did not opine that the property was an imminent
threat to the public."); Shore, 134 B.R. at 578-79 (after being apprised of the environ-
mental violations, "the actions of the TWC vis-a-vis the Debtor have been tepid at
best with little m the way of enforcement being effected."); Anthony Ferrante, 119
B.R. at 50; Purco, 76 B.R. at 533 ("The court infers from the DER's lack of interest in
this proceeding that there is no threat to the public health or safety which warrants
DER's participation.").
171. See Anthony Ferrante, 119 B.R. at 50.
172. FCX, 96 B.R. at 55 (footnote omitted).
173. See North American Products, 137 B.R. at 12 ("[Tlhe State was concerned
primarily with the public fisc, and not the public welfare."); Anthony Ferrante, 119
B.R. at 50 ("It certainly seems that DEP was at least as concerned with protecting the
public fisc as it was with protecting the public health.").
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claim 74 or even discharged if the debtor is an mdividual. 17 If they
think.the debtor may file for bankruptcy, they have the incentive to sit
on their hands until after the filing and then pursue cleanup because
at least then they will have a good shot at obtaining reimbursement as
a first priority administrative expense. 76 Tis lack of incentive or
174. See Sward, supra note 24, at 434 ("If the state has done the work itself prior to
the date of the petition, there is no priority."); Shanker, supra note 120, at 189 ("If
[the bankruptcy] takes place after the state itself had cleaned up the hazard (as typi-
cally it eventually would do), then the state in the later bankruptcy case would hold
only an unsecured claun for reumbursement.").
175. See Kahn, supra note 2, at 2009 ("Where the PRP's actions, the discovery of
the hazard, and the EPA's response all occur pre-petition, courts agree that the CER-
CLA liability is a claim m bankruptcy on which the debtor is entitled to a discharge.")
(citing Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1985)); Johanssen, supra note 48, at 212 ("As a
pre-petition debt, an environmental cleanup obligation has been characterized as a
pecumary interest that is subject to discharge.") (citing Kovacs); 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(5)
(1993) (definition of "claim" as a "right to payment" or "right to an equitable remedy
for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right to payment"); 11
U.S.C.A. § 727(b) (1993) (debtor discharged "from all debts that arose before the
date of the order for relief' and "any liability on a claim if such claim had arisen
before the commencement of the case."). Kovacs specifically involved the obligation
of an individual to clean up property that was in violation of Ohio environmental
laws. 469 U.S. at 276. These violations occurred pre-petition. Id. For the Supreme
Court, this was the key factor, "[because since the obligation arises out of Kovacs'
past, Oino is entitled to use Kovacs' existing assets to satisfy that obligation and, ac-
cordingly, it bears the attributes that make it a "claim" for purposes of bankruptcy
[and discharge allowance]."). DOUGLAS G. BAIRD & THOMAs H. JACKSON, CASES,
PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY 772 (2d ed. 1990). Baird and Jackson
argue that the difficult question of whether a claim arises pre-petition or post-petition
should not be the issue in discharge cases. Id. at 773. Instead, they emphasize that
"whether Kovac's obligation was dischargeable under existing law should have been a
narrow question of whether that obligation falls within one of the exceptions in
§ 523." Id.
176. See 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 507(a)(1), 503(b)(1)(A) (1993). As Mirsky and Ins col-
leagues explain,
[o]rdinarily, unsecured clais arising from pre-petition activities of the
debtor share equally with other unsecured claims unless such claims are
granted priority by Code Section 507(a). Claims arising under the environ-
mental laws, however, present a unique set of facts since such claims are
often based on both the pre-petition activity of the debtor and the ongoing
post-petition contamination and property damage, the costs of the elimma-
tion of which could be considered as an administrative expense to preserve
the estate. In many cases it is almost impossible to separate the pre-petition
damage from the post-petition damage and quantify each.
Mirsky et al., supra note 9, at 654. So, it is not surprising that whether an environ-
mental obligation that arises pre-petition, but is corrected post-petition, is an admims-
trative expense or sunply an unsecured claun is a difficult question. The Supreme
Court had a chance to provide an answer in Midlantic, but decided to sidestep the
issue. 474 U.S. at 498 n.2 (the question of whether New York is entitled to reimburse-
ment of its expenses as an admstrative expense "is not before us."). Regardless of
your agreement with those who say that the Supreme Court implicitly ruled for ad-
miistrative expenses in these cases (because forcing the trustee to comply in Midlan-
tic would force him to expend estate assets), the picture is still muddled. See Klee &
Merola, supra note 99, at 10 ("The Supreme Court's decision does little more than
legislate a priority imposing the cost of cleanup on the creditors of a bankrupt com-
pany rather than on the entire populace of a particular state."); Perkins, supra note 2,
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motivation has been overlooked or purposely sidestepped by a
majority of the courts that have rejected Midlantic and allowed
abandonment. 177
at 1585 ("Developing a reliable test based on post-Midlantic decisions is nearly impos-
sible for determining whether cleanup expenses merit administrative priority."). A
majority of courts have agreed with the implicit Supreme Court view, reasoning that
"since compliance with environmental laws is a prerequisite to abandonment, the
costs expended in achieving compliance and in ultimately assuring the public health
are a necessary cost of preserving the estate." Losch, supra note 15, at 163 (citing In
re Wall Tube & Metal Prod., Inc., 831 F.2d 118 (6th Cir. 1987); In re Peerless Plating
Co., 70 B.R. 943 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987); In re Stevens, 68 B.R. 774 (Bankr. D. Me.
1987); In re Pierce Coal and Constr., Inc., 65 B.R. 521 (N.D. W Va. 1986); In re T.P.
Long Chem., Inc., 45 B.R. 278 (N.D. Oluo 1985)); see Mirsky et al., supra note 9, at
654 ("[Cjourts have held that, to the extent the claim represents a claim for reim-
bursement for money expended post-petition, it should be classified as an admimstra-
tive expense.") (citing e.g., In re Microfab Inc., 105 B.R. 168 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989);
In re Distrigas Corp., 66 B.R. 382, 386 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1986); In re Laurmburg Oil,
Co., 49 B.R. 654 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1989)). The minority view posits its own rationale
that the clean-up orders are pre-petition and unsecured claims because they are
"based on pre-petition conduct, compensatory in nature, and without benefit to the
estate." Losch, supra note 15, at 162 (citing In re Dant & Russell, 853 F.2d 700 (9th
Cir. 1988); So. Ry. v. Johnson Bronze Co., 758 F.2d 137 (3d Cir. 1985)); see also
Mirsky et al., supra note 9, at 654 ("Some courts have held that since these claims
arose pre-petition, they should be treated as unsecured claims.") (citing e.g., In re
Stirling Mfg. Co., No. 88-01190, slip op. at 31 (Bankr. D.N.J. Aug. 22, 1988). An in-
depth analysis of the conflict will not be attempted here. However, it can be said that
the argument of the court in FCX is persuasive: "[t]he Bankruptcy Code does not
provide a priority for environmental damage caused by a debtor's pre-petition acts,
and, even when public policy may favor a priority, the court may not create one when
one does not exist." 96 B.R. at 54 n.10 (citing minority cases and COLLER). The
analogy that the FCX court makes to Kovacs is one that is hard to ignore: "[t]he
United States Supreme Court has held that a state's pre-petition injunction directing
the clean up of a hazardous waste site created no more than a general, unsecured
claim not entitled to priority." Id. (citing Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 282-83). For a fine arti-
cle taking the majority position, see Joseph P Cistulli, Note, Striking A Balance Be-
tween Competing Policies: The Administrative Claim as an Alternative to Enforce State
Clean-Up Orders in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 16 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. Rnv 581
(1989). In opposition is Klerman, supra note 14.
177 See generally Sward, supra note 24, at 434-37. This Note is concentrating on
"present" reimbursement claims that environmental agencies have against the Chap-
ter 7 debtor's estate, e.g., those situations where "the right to payment or an equitable
remedy already exists." Mirsky et al., supra note 9, at 650. In Chapter 11 cases, one
can also look to the possibility of a debtor discharging "contingent" claims as a moti-
vating factor for delaying tactics on the part of the EPA and its state partners. A
"contingent" claim is "the right to payment or an equitable remedy [that] is depen-
dent upon the occurrence of some other event that is reasonably expected to occur."
Id. As one commentator explains, "CERCLA claims not subject to administrative
expense priority are considered general unsecured claims m bankruptcy, and there-
fore will typically be impaired in a reorganization plan." Kahn, supra note 2, at 2008-
09 (footnote omitted). The Code provides that "[ojnce the reorganization plan is con-
firmed, the debtor will receive a discharge from any pre-confirmation CERCLA lia-
bility not included in the plan." Id. at 2009. Therefore, "there is a strong incentive for
the reorganizing debtor to include future CERCLA response-cost liabilities in the
bankruptcy plan, and conversely, a strong incentive for the EPA to assert the claims
against the reorganized debtor after the bankruptcy proceeding " Id. (emphasis
added). The debate over contingent claims centers around the question of when the
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A last Franklin Signal consideration manifested m the decisions of
the majority of courts in abandonment cases is whether or not there
are any unencumbered assets in the estate available to comply with an
environmental clean up order. Many m this category have virtually
said: "no funds, no compliance, no abandonment restriction."'178 One
court, clearly influenced by the Franklin Signal decision, implied that
the existence of other parties who could absorb the costs of clean-up
created a presumption that the estate's assets should in no way be
utilized for compliance. 179 Still another court has taken this unwilling-
ness to expend estate funds to comply a step farther, refusing to force
the trustee to use available unencumbered assets on clean up.'80 It is
true that the Midlantic court, by denying abandonment in the case,
really put the trustee in a bind. He had to comply with the environ-
mental laws and clean-up orders but had no assets to do this. The
Court gave no guidance with regard to this matter. Since the Court
did not make a determination as to the nature of unencumbered assets
that the Chapter 7 trustee could use to comply with the law, it is fair to
say that whether or not the lack of assets is a dispositive trigger for
abandonment is still up in the air.'8 1 The argument of the courts
above, surprisingly, is sound and will not conflict with the Midlantic
holding. As the court in Oklahoma Refining pointed out: "[t]o re-
quire strict compliance with State environmental laws under the facts
of this case [no unencumbered assets] could create a bankruptcy case
in perpetuity and fetter the estate to a situation without resolve. '' "n
The Midlantic Court would never had intended such a result.
claim "arose," because only pre-confirmation unsecured claims can be discharged. Id.
For excellent background on the issue and a discussion of the judiciary's inability to
achieve a consensus, see Kerry H. Mithalal, Balancing CERCLA and the Bankruptcy
Code: The Legitimacy of Discharging Contingent Claims for Unincurred Response
Costs in Chapter 11, 4 FoRDHAm ENvTL. L. REP. 241 (1993); Jonas, supra note 7.
178. See, e.g., Doyle Lumber, 137 B.R. at 203 ("The fact that there will be few or no
unencumbered assets for distribution to the creditors m this case favors abandon-
ment."); North American Products, 137 B.R. at 12 ("[T]here are no unencumbered
assets available to the Trustee to pay for site security or to remove the sludge and
drums."); Oklahoma Ref., 63 B.R. at 565 ("there are no funds available to finance the
closure plan or post-closure monitoring.").
179. Purco, 76 B.R. at 533 ("[T]here is no showing that the landlord/landowner
which will be in possession of such inventory upon abandonment, is not capable of
any remedy which may be necessary to adequately protect the public.").
180. Shore, 134 B.R. at 579-80; but see MCI, 151 B.R. at 108 ("If the estate has
unencumbered assets, then 'the bankruptcy court should require stricter compliance
with state environmental law before abandonment is permitted' ") (quoting Better-
Brite I, 105 B.R. at 919).
181. Interestingly enough, the bankruptcy court on January 28, 1987, with the con-
sent of all parties involved, authorized the eventual abandonment of the Quanta
properties because the trustee had no funds available to pay for any remedial activi-
ties on the site. Heldor, 131 B.R. at 588 n.9.
182. 63 B.R. at 565. The implication is also that if the estate is simply unable to
comply for financial reasons, the property will be abandoned anyway after the admin-
istration of the case. See 11 U.S.C. § 554(c) ("Unless the court orders otherwise, any
property scheduled under section 521(1) of this title not otherwise administered at the
1993]
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C. A Midlantic Result With a Non-Midlantic Rationale
Five courts, In re Mowbray Engineering, Co.,' In re Smith-
Douglass,"8 In re Better-Brite Plating,8 5 In re FCX, Inc.,' 86 and
Leavell v. Karnes,'87 have allowed an abandonment of property of the
estate by a trustee, but only conditioned on the payment of adminis-
trative expenses to the agency performing the clean-up duties on the
property.188
Four of the courts m this category are just as guilty as their majority
counterparts in reading Midlantic to require that there be "an mumi-
nent and identifiable" harm to the public before abandonment can be
halted.189 However, their goal is far from the "abandonment at all
costs" approach espoused by the majority of cases discussed above.
Look at how the FCX court defines "imminent": "[i]n holding that
the danger is miminent, the court recognizes that the environmental
threat may not be fully manifested for several years. Nevertheless, the
danger is immediate m the sense that there is a present and real possi-
time of the closing of the case is abandoned to the debtor and administered for pur-
poses of section 350 of this title.").
183. 67 B.R. 34, 35-36 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 1986).
184. Borden, Inc. v. Wells-Fargo Bus. Credit (In re Smith-Douglass, Inc.), 856 F.2d
12 (4th Cir. 1988).
185. 105 B.R. at 918.
186. 96 B.R. at 55.
187. 143 B.R. at 219.
188. See Leavell, 143 B.R. at 219 (actual § 503(b)(1)(A) administrative expenses
will be granted); FCX, 96 B.R. at 55 (trustee shall set aside $250,000 to pay for antici-
pated clean up costs); Better-Brite I, 105 B.R. at 917 (agency granted an adminstrative
expense lien on the property for the value of the clean up, over and above secured
creditors); Smith-Douglass, 856 F.2d at 13 (state agency entitled to administrative ex-
penses, but the estate has no unencumbered assets); Mowbray, 67 B.R. at 36 (will be
given a § 507 priority). By first allowing the environmental agencies to move in and
clean up the property, and then permitting the formal abandonment, the courts are
avoiding a problem Judge Gibbons pointed out in Quanta. 739 F.2d at 923-24 (Gib-
bons, J., dissenting). In his dissent, he criticized the majority for approving adnms-
trative expenses for clean up after abandonment. Id. He pointed out that after
abandonment, "the cestui [trustee] has no interest in it [the property] and in turn no
right to expend assets of the estate cleaning it up." ld., see Paige, supra note 52, at
362-63. On the other hand, an administrative expense lien granted for work subse-
quent to formal abandonment is a security interest that would survive the divestment
while not intruding on the Takings Clause of the United States Constitution. See
Kessler v. Tarrats, 466 A.2d 581 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1983), affd, 476 A.2d 326 (N.J.
Super. Ct. 1984) (New Jersey's superlien is constitutional because an agency granted
such a lien is "improving" the collateral for other secured creditors).
189. Leavell, 143 B.R. at 218 ("[fln order to comply with the mandate of Midlantic,
the bankruptcy court must first determine whether conditions on the property pose an
immediate and identifiable threat to the public health or safety."); FCX, 96 B.R. at 54
("Full compliance with all environmental laws is not required prior to abandonment,
but abandonment is not authorized when there is an immediate threat to the public
health and safety and an imminent danger of death and illness."); Smith-Douglass, 856
F.2d at 16 (abandonment warranted when "the public health or safety is [not]
threatened with imminent and identifiable harm"); Better-Brite I, 105 B.R. at 917 (if
no munment harm or danger to the public, abandonment is permitted).
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bility of public exposure to those deadly substances if they are not
removed."'190 What better way to justify a "conditional" abandon-
ment than to say that there is a dangerous situation not warranting
untrammeled abandonment, having defined imminent danger in the
most expansive form imaginable.
These courts are trying to "sit on the fence" by allowing abandon-
ment so the estate can rid itself of the future costs of maintaining the
property, while at the same time appeasing the state and federal agen-
cies which can recover some of their costs via an adnmstrative ex-
pense priority. It is true that in the end, these "down the middle"
results will probably be what the Midlantic court ultimately desired.
However, there is a better way of achieving results: read what the
opinion says.
D Going the Other Way: Reading Midlantic Too Strictly
In what seems like an epidemic, several courts have followed the
others in misinterpreting the Midlantic mandate. The courts here, un-
like those described earlier, cannot be accused of encouraging aban-
donment to the ultimate detriment of exasperated and irate state and
federal agencies. They have instead, drawn the ire of Chapter 7 trust-
ees who are forced to completely and unequivocally comply with envi-
ronmental laws despite the fact that they may not have the estate
funds to prevent a continuing violation.' 9'
As implied in this Note's analysis of Midlantic's three-part test, a
violation of a state or federal environmental law does not per se pre-
clude an abandonment authorization. Under Midlantic, if a violation
is found to have occurred, but there are simply no unencumbered as-
sets in the estate to comply with the law, abandonment is warranted
despite the contravention of the law. This group of overzealous courts
has ignored this implicit condition and have simply set up a prophylac-
tic rule: broken law, no abandonment until compliance is achieved in
its entirety. For instance, as the Stevens court emphasizes: "[t]he
trustee was obligated to comply with valid Maine law regulating dis-
posal of hazardous waste."'" This disregard of the Midlantic holding
is as offensive as distortions carried out by the courts supporting
abandonment.
190. FCX, 96 B.R. at 55 (emphasis m onginal).
191. Lancaster v. State of Tennessee (In re Wall Tube), 831 F.2d 118 (6th Cir. 1987);
In re Stevens, 68 B.R. 774 (D. Me. 1987); In re Peerless Plating Co., 70 B.R. 943
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987).
192. Stevens, 68 B.R. at 782; see also Wall Tube, 831 F.2d at 122 ("In this case, the
hazards were identified by the THDE's senes of inspections. Wall Tube's trustee,
under those circumstances, could not have abandoned the property."); Peerless, 70
B.R. at 947-48 ("[U]nder Midlantic the Trustee could not abandon the Peerless site in
violation of CERCLA.").
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V. THE MODEL
This Note has argued that the post-Midlantic courts have abused the
language of Midlantic to achieve whatever ends they desire. The goal
of every court should be to avoid usurpation of the Supreme Court's
authority in the legal scheme, while at the same time not losing sight
of bankruptcy goals in the process. Such a balance is necessary be-
cause it is unlikely that the abandonment provision or any other part
of the Code will be amended any time soon.' 93
The legal reasoning of the Midlantic court, comprised mostly of a
distortion of statutory construction, is flawed. However, there is a
strong argument that the end results are appropriate. This position
has been taken by Thomas Jackson, the proponent of the persuasive
"no conflict" theory.
Jackson contends that a debtor should have to fulfill the same envi-
ronmental obligations under bankruptcy that he should have to com-
ply with outside of bankruptcy. 94 It may be argued that the
opportunity for special treatment is a chief motive for filing. How-
ever, besides giving debtors the proverbial "fresh start," the Bank-
ruptcy Code is designed to ensure that creditors are not "engaging in a
destructive race to the debtor's assets."' 95 Once this "collectivization
goal" is achieved, "the next step in bankruptcy analysis is to find the
closest available nonbankruptcy analogy to what is occurring in bank-
ruptcy, and to try to sort out the substantive rights of parties under
that analogy."196 These goals should be paramount, and all others
should be discouraged. A logical outgrowth of all of this is that there
193. On September 15, 1993, the Senate Judiciary Committee did approve an
amended version of S. 540, and sent it off to the full Senate for consideration and a
possible vote later in the year. Senate Judiciary Committee Approves Bankruptcy Re-
form Measure as Amended, BNA's BANKING REPORT (BNA), September 20, 1993,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omm File. Among the many substantial proposals
in the Bankruptcy Amendments Act of 1993 is the formation of "what the American
Bankruptcy Institute calls a national 'blue-ribbon commission' to study the bank-
ruptcy code and recommend reforms." Robert O'Brien, Bankruptcy Code Changes:
The Good, The Bad ., ME-RGERs & AcQuisrrIoNs REPORT, September 27, 1993,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omm File. The measure is expected to pass the
Senate easily, but the House has traditionally been a formidable hurdle for any bank-
ruptcy reform. See Joseph D. Hutnyan, Reform Legislation Regains Momentum with
Senate Vote, BANKING POLICY REPORT, October 4, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Omm File (the House rejected a similar bill in 1992). There is strong opposi-
tion to the legislation from private groups as well. Help a Senator to Rewrite Flawed
Bankruptcy Law, CRAN's NEW YoRK BusINEss, August 16, 1993 - August 22, 1993,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omm File ("The National Bankruptcy Congress
- a group of lawyers, judges and professors - opposes reform.").
194. Jackson, supra note 5, at 399; see also Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55
(1978) ("Property interests are created and defined by state law. Unless some federal
interest requires a different result, there is no reason why such interest should be
analyzed differently simply because an interested party is involved in a bankruptcy
proceeding.").
195. Jackson, supra note 5, at 399.
196. Id.
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should be a prevention of "forum shopping" so that debtors will enter
bankruptcy for one of the legitimate reasons mentioned above, and
not to play disruptive "bide and seek" games with obligations.
Jackson says that in cases of abandonment m a nonbankruptcy set-
ting, an owner would probably not be able to abandon before comply-
ing with environmental orders and obligations. As Jackson mentions,
"[a]s a matter of nonbankruptcy law, it [the State] may be able to
prohibit any distribution of any of [the] Firm's assets in a dissolution
to any creditor unless and until [the] Site is cleaned up."' 97 Addition-
ally, the "State [probably] has the equivalent of a statutory lien on
[the] Site itself, because any owner - whether acquiring title by gift,
purchase, or foreclosure - will bear clean up responsibility "191 What
should result then is a prohibition of abandonment in the bankruptcy
forum until the environmental obligations are satisfied.
In light of the Midlantic decision, the goal of a bankruptcy court
with regard to the abandonment of environmentally-impacted prop-
erty by the Chapter 7 should be clear: restrict it as much as feasible
and possible. The remaining part of the paper will be devoted to set-
ting out a brief model that judges should adhere to in order to comply
with Midlantic and the objectives of bankruptcy.
A. The Automatic Stay
At the start of the proceeding, the court will have made a determi-
nation of the applicability of section 362 to EPA/state agency efforts
to enforce a clean up order. This determination, as noted by one com-
mentator, involves the answering of two questions: (1) does this ac-
tion by CERCLA or the state environmental agency fall within the
police or regulatory exception of section 362(b)(4) and (2) if so, can
this action be deemed an action to enforce a money judgment and
therefore be prohibited by section 362(b)(5)? 199 Overall, "[t]he juris-
prudence indicates that the automatic stay is virtually useless in the
face of CERCLA [or state agency] actions to enforce clean up man-
dates or to assess liability. 200
B. Is the Property Burdensome?
The next consideration every court must take into account is
whether the property is "burdensome" or of "inconsequential value
197. Ia at 419.
198. Id
199. Losch, supra note 15, at 153. Once again, like the administrative expense
claim, there is a hotly disputed battle over the stay's applicability to environmental
cleanup orders. It will not be discussed m detail here. See Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S.
274 (1985); United States v. Nicolet, 857 F.2d 202 (3d Cir. 1988); Penn Terra Ltd. v.
Department of EnvtL Resources, 733 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1984); United States v. Mattiace,
73 B.R. 816 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1987).
200. Losch, supra note 15, at 158.
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and benefit to the estate. '20 1 If the Chapter 7 trustee is unsuccessful
in meeting this burden through a showing of an inability to sell the site
in question, or the existence of numerous liens and various encum-
brances burdening the property, or that the post-clean up value of the
property is much lower than the anticipated clean up costs, the analy-
sis must end here and abandonment must be denied.202
C. Check for Assets
If there are no assets in the estate, a judge should consider dis-
missing the bankruptcy case right away. Several courts have pursued
such a strategy2°3 because if the battle is simply over the regulatory
debt, and there is difficulty procuring a Chapter 7 trustee who can
adequately administer such a clean up, it may be better to dismiss for
cause under section 707 of the Code 2 4 and let state courts deal with
the problem absent bankruptcy restnctions (i.e., the automatic stay).
There will, most importantly, also be little if no prejudice to existing
creditors as well.
D. The Three-Prong Midlantic Test
If the trustee passes the "burden" hurdle, the court must next rec-
oncile the abandonment motion with Midlantic by using the three
prong approach. The courts should never assume that the test is satis-
fied or rejected without a hearing to let the parties present their views
on the subject of compliance with Midlantic. A bankruptcy judge may
be overruled for ignoring such a hearing.20'
201. See 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1993).
202. It was indicated earlier m this Note that in most cases, a trustee's determina-
tion that the property is a burden or inconsequential is not disputed. The Sixth Cir-
cuit, however, emphasizes that § 554 was amended to read "inconsequential value and
benefit" to the estate. This higher burden on the trustee, says the court, was instituted
for a reason, and is something that the trustee should have to satisfy with truly sub-
stantive proof. In re K.C. Machine & Tool Co., 816 F.2d 238, 245 (6th Cir. 1987).
203. See In re Commercial Oil Service, Inc., 88 B.R. 126 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987)
(dismissal warranted under § 707(a), not § 305); In re 30 Hill Top Street Corp., 42
B.R. 517 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984) ("Where a bankruptcy case is impossible to admins-
ter because of a lack of funds and the presence of a threat to public safety, a bank-
ruptcy court has the duty to dismiss the case in order to return the case to a forum
with appropriate authority and remedial powers."); In re Charles George Land Recla-
mation Trust, 30 B.R. 918 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1983) (dismissal was warranted because
there were negligible assets available m the estate, outlandish clean up costs, and no
trustee was willing to serve m this case).
204. 11 U.S.C. § 707(a) states: "[t]he Court may dismiss a case under this chapter
only after notice and a hearing and only for cause, including " The reasons
mentioned above are not mentioned in this list, but the word "including" in the stat-
ute indicates that the list is not exclusive.
205. State of New Jersey Dep't of Envt'l Protection v. North American Prod. Co.,
137 B.R. 8, 12 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1992).
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E. Abandon or Not?
The hierarchy of reasoning should be straightforward. If the
Midlantic analysis warrants abandonment, the motion should be
granted, with no questions asked. If the conditions on the site warrant
a non-abandonment "verdict," one must move to a more specific
level of questioning: whether or not there are enough unencumbered
assets in the estate to comply with the clean up order and the applica-
ble environmental laws.
The existence of sufficient unencumbered funds to effectuate a
complete clean up will force the trustee to satisfy all of the estate's
obligations. A lack of this minimum funding m the estate will warrant
a different result. In this case, the court should authorize the trustee's
conveyance of possessory interest in the polluted property to the envi-
ronmental agency through section 725 of the Code.2°6 This unique
solution to abandonment problems has been implemented by only one
court,20 7 but its advantages are overwhelming. The clean up will be
carried out by an agency that actually knows what it is doing,20 8 the
trustee is temporarily relieved from any potential personal liability,2 0 9
and the grant of unsecured status to the agency (if they do not have a
206. 11 U.s.c. § 725 (1993) ("After the commencement of a case under tis chap-
ter, but before final distribution of property of the estate under section 726 of tis
title, the trustee, after notice and a hearing, shall dispose of any property in which an
entity other than the estate has an interest, such as a lien, and that has not been
disposed of under another section of this title.").
207. In re 82 Milbar Blvd. Inc., 91 B.R. 213 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1988).
208. Id. at 220.
209. Id. A trustee's potential personal liability for violations of environmental obli-
gations that may occur on this polluted property is a seriously underdeveloped doc-
trine. What trustees are worrying about is first, 28 U.S.C. § 959(b)'s mandate for the
trustee to comply with state laws when "operating" the site. Also, there are statutes
that impose strict liability on those who operate a site for the costs of an environmen-
tal clean up and relevant damages. CERCLA is one of these. Only two courts have
attempted to judicially define the scope of this liability in the environmental context.
The first, State v. Better-Brite Plating, Inc., 168 Wis. 2d 363, 483 N.W. 2d 574 (Wis.
1992), consolidated existing but sparse caselaw on general trustee personal liability
and articulated a rule of thumb: if the trustees do not act outside the scope of their
authority when violating any applicable law, they would not be subject to state court
jurisdiction in their personal capacities. Id. at 583-84. The Wisconsin Supreme Court
said: "the court of appeals noted the 'devastating impact' that such a holding would
have on the pool of persons willing to serve as trustees. We find such public policy
considerations compelling." Id. at 583. This case was cited approvingly in the federal
case, In re Sundance Corp., 149 B.R. 641 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 1993). Here, a Chapter
11 receiver was not held to be personally liable for clean up costs in connection with
the release of hazardous substances at a mortgagor's orchard. The court held that the
receiver would not be personally liable to the estate even though he had engaged in
abnormally dangerous activities on the site, acting in the scope of his authority
shielded him from liability under state environmental laws, and such a receiver would
be granted derivative judicial immunity under CERCLA for being a state court re-
ceiver and bankruptcy custodian. Id Even with tis favorable precedent, a trustee
still cannot always count on this immunity. That is why a conveyance such as tis will
help. See generally Jeffery, supra note 40; E. Allan Tiller, Personal Liability of Trust-
ees and Receivers in Bankruptcy, 53 AM. BANKR. LJ. 75 (1979).
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superlien, either federal or state) for the clean up will not disturb the
priority status of other creditors.2 10 After the clean-up, the estate still
has title and then can do whatever it wants with it (i.e., sell it off,
abandon it, etc.).
F. What Will the Agencies Get Out of This?
The clean up, conducted and supervised by the EPA or the state
environmental agency, will be granted and is entitled to an unsecured
claim.21 ' Aside from being justified by statutory and case law, there
will be no incentive for the EPA to wait forever to obtain reimburse-
ment for admstrative expenses. The EPA will be designated an un-
secured creditor whether or not there is an abandonment, and the
agency will want to get m and clean up the property as soon as possi-
ble. This is inevitable, since the longer they wait the more they will
have to pay to clean it up later on. A bankruptcy court should be not
be responsible for compensating for the istakes of states and the
federal government vNluch will not institute higher bonding require-
ments, 2 give environmental agencies a more powerful lien, or simply
amend the Code itself.
CONCLUSION
The controversy over the role of section 554 in the contravention of
environmental laws is far from over. With the Supreme Court's
Midlantic decision solving nothing, both because of its generality and
the fact that lower courts are ignoring its language anyway, the best
thing anyone can do is simply get back to basics: read what the
Midlantic decision really says, and add a touch of knowledge about
what we are actually trying to do by having a bankruptcy system. Fol-
lowing such a mandate will make for more consistent and judicious
results.
Stephen B. Kong
210. Milbar, 91 B.R. at 220.
211. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
212. Johannsen, supra note 48, at 226 ("If the [performance] bonding is inadequate
to cover the actual cleanup costs, the fault lies in the bonding requirements, not the
Bankruptcy Code.").
